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Abstract 
 
On July 4th, 2007, a small group of housing activists set up a tent city encampment in a 
plaza adjacent to New Orleans City Hall. The action resulted in the creation of 
Homeless Pride, a small group of politicized Plaza residents.  Six months later, 
hundreds of homeless people were moved from the park, and it was fenced off. Using 
archival videos, interviews, and news media, this thesis analyzes the opportunities and 
constraints that activists, service providers, and local officials faced in light of two 
intersecting and overlapping contexts. The first context is the immediate crisis of the 
levee failures after Hurricane Katrina, and the second is the longer-term national 
political-economic context of “neoliberal urbanism”. Because of dire short-term 
circumstances, Homeless Pride articulated a message of homelessness as a “crisis” even 
though they had larger structural goals and vision. In light of recent “Occupy” 
movements, this case study addresses crucial questions for organizers and 
policymakers attempting to combat poverty and wealth inequality. 
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Epigraph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“If the ghetto burns down we will not know it because it does not show on the symap. If it is not 
in the census, it is not sensed. If remote sensing is efficient, and it is, why does it follow, and it 
does not, that intimate sensing is not? We have become so situational that we have lost sight of 
the site unless we can cite it in a senseless census. Great God, we have to sneak outdoors.” 
 
 --William Bunge, Fitzgerald from a Distance (1974) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Already the Great Khan was leafing through his atlas, over the maps of cities that menace in 
nightmares and maledictions: Enoch, Babylon, Yahooland, Butua, Brave New World. He said, 
“It is all useless, if the last landing place can only be the infernal city, and it is there that, 
in ever-narrowing circles, the current is drawing us.” 
 
And Polo said: “The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if there is one it is 
what is already here, the inferno where we live every day, that we form by being 
together. There are two ways to escape suffering it. The first is easy for many: accept the 
inferno and become such a part of it that you can no longer see it. The second is risky 
and demands constant vigilance and apprehension: seek and learn to recognize who 
and what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then make them endure, give 
them space.” 
  
--Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities (1972) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Even a dog could use the park as a bathroom.” 
  
--Larry Boley, Homeless New Orleanian (2007) 
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I. Introduction 
 
 
 On October 6, 2011, less than one month after the start of the “Occupy Wall 
Street” movement that claimed as its base a privately-owned public space in downtown 
Manhattan, hundreds of New Orleanians marched in downtown New Orleans to begin 
their own version of this national and global movement. Just as New York City had 
Zuccotti Park, “Occupy NOLA” claimed as its base a small inert green space directly in 
front of the main entrance to City Hall called Duncan Plaza. In selecting Duncan Plaza, 
Occupy NOLA, like its brethren in cities across the United States, was choosing to 
emphasize visibility in their strategic choice of territory. These spaces, in addition to 
being highly visible, also possess a symbolic importance that is difficult to replicate in 
other public spaces.  
 After a month of a mixture of hospitality and neglect from the City of New 
Orleans, Mayor Mitch Landrieu served notice that the people and tents of Occupy 
NOLA had begun to wear out their welcome: “At some point in time,” the Mayor 
stated, “it's going to get beyond just a First Amendment expression” (Donze 2011b).  
The mayor’s concern was in keeping with the growing “concerns” of mayors around 
the country, who were noticing an increasingly unwelcome blend of the involuntarily 
unsheltered—usually known as the homeless—converging with the voluntary 
protestors in these sites (Nagourney 2011; McKinley and Goodnough 2011).  While the 
city could, in 2011, afford to allow the occupy movement to exist, with its diffuse 
structure and seeming lack of specific programmatic demands, the recent history of 
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Duncan Plaza suggested that even a benign action such as Occupy NOLA could quickly 
become far more of a political problem for local politicians. 
 Several years earlier, for six months in 2007, Duncan Plaza was a contentious 
flashpoint of the ongoing drama (and trauma) of the post-Katrina reconstruction of the 
city of New Orleans. On July 4th, 2007, a small group of housing activists, public 
housing tenants, and a solidarity delegation of Thai activists from their tsunami-
impacted coast, set up a symbolic tent city encampment in the areas of the plaza most 
visible to pedestrians, traffic, and City Hall.1 The stated purpose of the occupation was 
to directly challenge (then) Mayor C. Ray Nagin to resolve several critical housing 
issues that the flooding of Katrina had created or exacerbated in the city of New 
Orleans: the closure of public housing, the spike in rents citywide, and the dramatic 
increase in homelessness since the flooding of the city less than two years earlier. 
Moreover, the planned encampment sought to make another important political 
statement: that people who do not have homes still have the same political rights to 
representation as housed people, and that local elected officials had a duty to represent 
them. 
Over the course of the following six months, the primary objectives of the 
occupation of Duncan Plaza shifted between the political goals of representation from 
local government, to focusing on the problems of housing and homelessness, to the 
strategic importance of visibility for people without shelter. Activists, people without 
                                                 
1 This legacy was part of the reason that the Occupy NOLA group chose Duncan Plaza 
as their home base. 
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homes, and their supporters unilaterally declared the plaza a “free zone” where the 
homeless could sleep outdoors without fear of arrest or police harassment. This loosely 
organized collective, whose leadership was drawn from a subset of the Plaza’s 
residents, were calling themselves “Homeless Pride” within a few weeks.  
In addition to focusing access to decent and affordable housing as a human right, 
Homeless Pride’s symbolic intervention was also to disrupt the city’s overriding 
narrative of being “recovered” or “in recovery” to a wider national audience. As part of 
a longer history of urban “occupation” actions, the presence of dozens of tents in a 
public plaza in the shadows of City Hall was doubly strategic: using a public and 
symbolic space to bring the “homelessness issue” to the attention of city officials and 
urge action by visually disrupting tourism and consumption-based economic activity in 
the downtown area. 
The strategy of visibility was indeed effective at getting the attention of the city—
but perhaps not in the way that activists had intended or desired. Rather than 
addressing the issues of homelessness and housing, the visibility of the encampment 
became the driving concern of city officials. The saving grace of the homeless 
encampment in Duncan Plaza —and the political problems it posed through its strategic 
visibility—is that it could be declared quantifiably concluded, regardless of long-term 
issues of homelessness in the city.  
 On December 21st, 2007, Duncan Plaza was completely fenced off. Dozens of 
tents with belongings still inside were tossed into garbage trucks, and the last of the 
Plaza’s hundreds of residents were relocated into various forms of temporary hotel 
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rooms, shelters, or semi-permanent supportive housing as part of a month-long 
intensive rapid re-housing initiative spearheaded by UNITY of Greater New Orleans.2 
In a press conference that morning, Executive Director Martha Kegel proclaimed to the 
assembled crowd and news media that UNITY had worked with numerous agencies 
and the city administration towards a “monumental achievement unprecedented 
anywhere in America” (UNITY 2007). She did not mention Homeless Pride or the role 
that some of its members played in bringing the issue to the attention of the city 
through their agitation and focus on visibility. Kegel’s silence on the existence and role 
of Homeless Pride in the six-month encampment served to diminish the larger 
structural and rights-based critiques that Homeless Pride had articulated during the 
encampment. The story instead was one of bureaucratic collaboration and triumph over 
a temporary crisis. From this dynamic I drew inspiration for the title of this piece: while 
the operation to resolve the problem of people sleeping in a public space was indeed 
successful, the original sickness that “the patient” complained about—poverty and 
structural issues of housing provision and inequality—ultimately went unaddressed. 
From the standpoint of current best practices for the delivery of services for 
homeless people, UNITY’s execution was indeed exemplary. While activists were 
stymied in their attempts to make larger policy gains at the city level and inject the 
discourse of human rights into the city’s framework for housing policy, they considered 
their ability to achieve some political influence on a city in flux, and to use that 
                                                 
2 UNITY of Greater New Orleans is an award-winning umbrella organization with its 
own staff and budget that consists of a collaborative of over 60 metropolitan service 
providers in the area of homelessness. 
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influence to help activate and mobilize resources to house hundreds of people, to be a 
qualified, short-term success.  
Additionally, housing activists and advocates for the homeless like UNITY were 
satisfied, if not proud, that unlike many cities in which homelessness and sleeping in 
public have been met with draconian municipal ordinances that criminalize the 
homeless (see Mitchell 2003; Arnold 2004), the city of New Orleans permitted—but did 
not support or condone—an initially small but ultimately significant congregation of 
over 200 people in various stages of homelessness without calling in the National Guard 
or police to make mass arrests and move people.3 Instead, the Nagin administration and 
City Council dispatched UNITY and emergency shelters to forge a solution to the 
“crisis” of visibility while petitioning the state and federal government for additional 
emergency funds and housing vouchers. Since the city’s main objective (unlike UNITY, 
housing activists and Homeless Pride) was to facilitate the invisibility of the 
encampment, the resolution of this affair satisfied their interests and the use of UNITY 
was helpful in putting a compassionate face on this dynamic.4 The repetition of similar 
situations in cities across the country has led political scientist Leonard Feldman to 
                                                 
3 This is particularly notable because these tactics were used periodically against other 
activists who were concurrently advocating against the demolition of New Orleans 
public housing during this same period of 2007.  
4 Many critical perspectives on homelessness, as I detail in Chapter two, argue that the 
interests of service providers such as UNITY are in lock step with city and economic 
elites to facilitate the invisibility of homelessness. While I am sympathetic to these 
structural critiques, I attempt to draw a more nuanced understanding of the multiple 
and variegated interests and prerogatives of an organization such as UNITY, whose 
interests and allegiances, like the other actors in this story, exist on a fluid spectrum, 
and are not as rigid as these critiques claim. 
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inquire if there isn’t some “hidden link between charitable appeals for food and 
shelter…and the punitive policies of displacement, harassment, and exclusion [that] 
permits the relatively easy slide from calls to eliminate homelessness to calls to eliminate 
the homeless” (Feldman 2006: pp. 5-6, emphasis in original). In staking a claim on such a 
strategically visible space, Homeless Pride and its supporters were forced to reckon 
with this double-edged sword of strategic visibility. 
What happened next? For months following the closure of Duncan Plaza, dozens 
of the same people and others continued to sleep outdoors under elevated roadways, 
bridges, and adjacent to formal homeless shelters. For having been such an 
“unprecedented achievement” at the time, four years later in 2011 there remain just shy 
of ten thousand people in various stages of homelessness in the New Orleans area on 
any given night, with most sleeping in abandoned buildings or on the streets (UNITY 
2011). This should lead urban scholars, activists, and policymakers to wonder what 
about the situation in Duncan Plaza was actually a “crisis” that differed from any other 
period in which thousands of New Orleanians are homeless on any given night. The 
most clear explanations for this difference lie both in the visibility of the encampment as 
well as its politics—both of which I address in Chapter two.   
This study demonstrates that city officials and housing activists’ invocation of 
Duncan Plaza as an “emergency” or “crisis” situation, while helpful to call attention to 
the urgency of the housing problems in post-Katrina New Orleans, allowed for the city 
of New Orleans to more easily justify using short-term, emergency measures to 
“resolve” it. This hindered a discussion about long-term solution to homelessness in 
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New Orleans. Despite the tremendous challenges facing these publicly visible struggles 
for greater social and economic justice, they are also spaces of alternative practice and 
opportunity. Despite the constraints on local organizing and particularly on organizing 
within and among the homeless, the post-Katrina situation in New Orleans was a 
highly dynamic and unstable situation that provided relatively rare opportunities for 
alternative visions for housing and economic justice and human rights frameworks to 
be heard. It is this dynamic context of “limits, possibilities, complexities and 
unpredictabilities” (Zupan 2011) in which I situate the efforts of Homeless Pride in 
2007. In doing so, I seek to shed light on both the constraints and opportunities of these 
local actions to promote new solutions to the various conditions of homelessness and 
poverty within the political-economic context of neoliberal urbanism as well as the 
specific upheaval of the post-Katrina moment—a moment that, after several years, 
continued to morph into a “new normal” (Demos 2009).  
In Chapter two, I begin with a literature review on homelessness as a social and 
political phenomenon. Neoliberalism has been implicated previously in the arena of 
homelessness, but most critiques address its effect on the criminalization of homeless 
bodies in public (Mitchell 2003), or on the specific practices of the sheltering industry 
(Lyon-Callo 2004). Other works on politicized homeless mobilizations (Wright 1997) 
simply need to be updated into 21st century urban contexts. This thesis fills in the gap in 
this literature by uniting these literatures to analyze politicized homeless mobilizations 
in a 21st century context. I also interrogate my own subjectivity in this project, and 
 9
briefly detail the ways in which scholars who study homelessness critically approach 
their own work. 
In Chapter three, I empirically analyze what homelessness meant to the 
organizers of the Duncan Plaza encampment, and how it intersected with other issues 
of housing instability and injustice. I then begin to examine how organizers created and 
perpetuated the small, politicized subset of Duncan Plaza encampment, as well as 
developed leadership among the residents of the Plaza. By seizing a space of strategic 
visibility and persistently calling attention to the situation of homelessness, they were 
able to activate themselves as participating citizens in the reconstruction of their 
hometown, rather than just recipients of charity and clients of services. In building a 
sense of self-esteem among those without shelter, organizers helped build a sense of 
political entitlement to representation that the poor and those without homes typically 
lack. Yet in building a narrative of homelessness as a “crisis”, they also impeded their 
chances of success by creating the opportunity for the city to “solve” the “problem” 
through just clearing the camp, rather than addressing (even cursorily) the structural 
issues that Homeless Pride articulated. 
In Chapter four, I show how Homeless Pride articulated a political agenda both 
in unison with, and distinct from, a concurrent movement to prevent the demolition of 
several thousand public housing apartments in New Orleans, and how the city 
responded and involved UNITY in its response. As Homeless Pride’s political program 
became more publicized, the city worked with state and local departments and service 
providers to continue to neutralize this component of the message, even as they actively 
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collaborated compassionately to offer clothing and food, as well as temporary shelter 
and housing for Plaza residents. Homeless Pride was able to communicate directly with 
city officials and with UNITY outreach workers, but their desire to become an active 
part of the decision-making apparatus was generally stymied or rejected. By December 
of 2007, the only solution that the city was actively considering involved closing down 
the Plaza without permanent housing solutions for all of its occupants—much less a 
larger plan for homelessness in New Orleans. 
By way of conclusion, Chapter five returns to fundamental questions. What does 
a “successful homelessness policy” look like? What would a “successful” organizing 
campaign look like for and among those who are homeless? How can organizers and 
policymakers move away from crisis frameworks for mobilization and policy when 
often—for individuals who are involuntarily living in dangerous conditions—
homelessness is actually an individual crisis?  How can movements for economic and 
spatial justice, which like any political movement are never without internal 
inconsistencies and contradictions, be given (or take) space to become a part of shaping 
the future of our cities? In examining these tensions as they occurred in Duncan Plaza, 
my goal is to offer a (hopefully) clear articulation of these intertwined problems so that 
those who are most involved and affected might have greater successes confronting 
them in the future. 
II: A Crisis of Policy and a Policy of Crisis 
It is tempting to imagine that…our categories and concepts do not need reworking, that 
all we have is a failure of will, not a failure of thought.  
      (Feldman 2006 p. 22) 
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It would take an “elastic notion,” writes anthropologist Kim Hopper, to 
understand the various reasons and circumstances of and for homelessness. “Indeed,” 
he argues, “the suspicion quickly mounts that seeking to impose order on the 
hodgepodge of dislocation, extreme poverty, migrant work, unconventional ways of 
life, and bureaucratic expediency that have, at one time or another, been labeled 
homeless may well be a fool’s errand” (2003: pp. 17-18). Hopper is pointing to an 
overriding concern with addressing homelessness as a policy matter. In this chapter I 
briefly attend to this “fool’s errand” and address the policy of crisis and the crisis of policy 
that confront our policy approaches specifically to the visible homeless. As Jencks notes, 
people in jails, detox centers, mental hospitals, and foster homes, lack formal “homes” 
in a social sense, but their invisibility does not bring them into the public view (1994: p. 
7). In this particular case study, the large-scale displacement and instability of 
communities in post-Katrina New Orleans also complicates how we might approach 
even a crude heuristic definition of the condition of homelessness.  
As Blau notes, the “visibility of the homeless, because even though people on the 
street make up just one part of the homeless population, it is their public poverty that 
has shaped virtually everybody else’s response to them” (1992: p. x). This concern with 
visibility dates back to the 1980s, when homelessness entered the federal policy arena in 
a highly politicized way as the result of a 1987 HUD study that identified a notable 
increase in homelessness. Further investigation and debate found the study to have 
methodological flaws, which led critics to argue that elements of the Democratic party 
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in HUD had fabricated the “homeless problem” or had “cooked” the results to 
purposefully inflate the number of homeless people to embarrass the Reagan 
administration  (Jencks 1994; O’Flaherty 1996).  
As a result, a substantial portion of the literature from the late 1980s and early 
1990s was focused on metrics and quantification. It addressed the issue of who exactly 
“the homeless” were, what their “problems” were, and their numbers.  In a sampling of 
literature on homelessness from this era, the most commonly identified root causes are: 
1) deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill and failure to provide housing alternatives 
for these people, 2) increased long-term joblessness in working age men, 3) reduction of 
cash welfare payments, and 4) the destruction of skid row (Jencks 1994). Other 
structural explanations typically include deindustrialization of the US economy, job 
income polarization, and cutbacks in the government’s role in providing for affordable 
housing (Bratt, et al 2006). As several scholars also noted throughout the 1990s, “much 
of the rise in the new homelessness has occurred in relatively prosperous times” 
(O’Flaherty 1996: p. 2; Blau 1992: p. 10).  Yet while the various explanations offered as 
causes of homelessness may explain, from structural causes to individual behaviors, the 
rise in homelessness during the 1980s and 1990s, they do not explain the policy 
response to it.  
Concurrently, federal policy on homelessness was just beginning to emerge 
during the same period (1980s and early 1990s). From the outset, it was designed to be a 
temporary supplement to declining federal spending on affordable housing, and what 
was viewed at the time as a temporary crisis relating to deinstitutionalization of the 
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mentally ill. As Paul Boden, Organizing Director of the Western Regional Advocacy 
Project argues, the principal federal funding stream for homelessness prevention and 
shelter services in the United States, the McKinney-Vento act (passed in 1987), was 
really passed as an emergency, stop-gap funding source for localities to access federal 
resources (NLCHP 2011; NCH 2006).  
 Even as chronic homelessness continued and grew throughout the nation’s 
urban areas, federal policy retained the operating assumption that these increases in 
homelessness were a temporary phenomenon. This federal policy shortcoming has 
undoubtedly hamstrung the capacity for even progressively minded municipal 
administrations to effectively tackle or prevent homelessness in its various forms. “This 
mistaken notion,” writes Hopper, present for decades, “that a passing crisis might be 
waited out has not only incurred huge social costs but created a massive artificial relief 
industry with a perverse interest in sustaining demand for its services” (2003: pp. 215-
16). Indeed, as Schwartz notes, as of 2005, there were 3,000 cities receiving federal funds 
to serve 700,000 people, with a total of $1.67 billion allocated to the McKinney-Vento 
stream for rapid rehousing and emergency shelter. Schwartz notes without much shock 
that this amount “has not proved sufficient to end homelessness in America” (2010: p. 
249).  
Since turn of the 21st century, “housing first” programs (Schwartz 2010: 250) have 
entered the federal policy lexicon for addressing homelessness. These current best 
practices have placed an emphasis on shelter first combined with intensive case 
management. This linking of services and bureaucratic streamlining across federal 
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agencies has been referred to as the “Continuum of Care” model. Municipalities are 
seeing success with these service delivery models, but funding streams for these 
Continuum of Care programs, some of which have even begun to incorporate the 
language of a human right to shelter, remain constrained by a McKinney-Vento funding 
structure largely generally unchanged from what first emerged in the response to the 
“crisis” of the 1980s. Thus what began in the 1980s as a mechanism for addressing what 
was perceived to be a short-term crisis has now, in the first decade of the 21st century, 
become the most significant funding stream for managing homelessness in the United 
States. This is a crisis of policy.  
Well-executed versions of these programs are achieving some promising results, 
but they are doing so within a larger political economy that is—by design—prohibiting 
not only the growth of these programs in terms of federal dollars, but also their 
integration into a larger anti-poverty, low-income housing, human rights-based social 
agenda. This is the policy of crisis. This trend of arranging short-term or emergency 
policy prescriptions for evidently structural problems has been noted previously, such 
as Blau’s concise point about expenditures:  
the list of interventions is hardly inconsequential. The local, state, and federal 
governments have spent billions of dollars on the homeless, and those 
expenditures have undoubtedly saved lives. Still, the key question in analyzing 
these social policies is why, proportionately, so much more money was spent on 
emergency measures (1992 p. 176, emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore, Hopper states plainly that such “emergency” measures are consistently 
“stymied…whenever the generative forces behind the ‘crisis’ go unchecked” (2003: p. 
195). For public policy to have a chance at resolving homelessness issues, even a robust 
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“evidence-based” (UNITY 2008) set of policies cannot exist successfully or sustainably 
outside of a larger suite of federal, state, and local affordable housing, living wage, and 
anti-poverty programs. As Sociologist Talmadge Wright notes in his seminal work, Out 
of Place: 
By separating the poor from the homeless, policy research, which could have 
addressed issues of structural inequality in order to end poverty, shifted into the 
containment of a subset of the poor via the construction of shelters and the 
promotion of job training. Containment of homelessness, not ending poverty, became the 
new goal of policy makers and politicians, and ending poverty faded from the 
political agenda (1997: p. 19, emphasis added).  
 
As the policy focus at a national level has moved away from anti-poverty and 
affordable housing programs, the dominant trend in homelessness policies has been to 
rehabilitate the homeless and focus on individual practices and behaviors, such as 
substance abuse. In addition to separating homelessness policy from other housing and 
economic issues, federal funding streams further subdivide programs for homelessness 
into additional groups such as teenagers, veterans, families, the mentally ill, those with 
substance abuse issues, and so forth (Wright 1997: p. 20). While there is nothing 
inherently wrong with creating specialized programs to address specific issues, this 
segmentation has occurred in concert with the increasing “medicalization” of 
homelessness (Lyon-Callo 2004). Indeed, as Blasi points out, in the 1990s there was 
more federal financing for research on homelessness from the National Institute of 
Mental Health than from HUD (cited in Wright 1997: p. 22).  
Other scholars have also linked this inextricably with neoliberalism. In the case of 
Duncan Plaza, the neoliberal context at work here is a political-economic system that 
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undermines the effective execution of social policy through the creation of a paradigm 
of perpetual financial shortfall. This system has enveloped organizing campaigns like 
those undertaken in Duncan Plaza, as well as the policy remedies designed to address 
homelessness over the past several decades. 
In the literature addressing neoliberalism, the trend of declining resources and 
the individualization of social policy at the multiple scales has taken on various names. 
These range from “neoliberal urbanism” (Brenner, Peck, Theodore 2005, 2009) to 
“neoliberal cities” (Hackworth 2007), or the “New Urban Politics” (DeFilippis 2004). By 
whatever name it takes, the general consensus is that this political-economic paradigm 
has helped construct political definitions of success, failure, and crisis over the past 
three decades that promote market-based solutions and de-emphasize the role of 
government in promoting a common or base standard of living. This is not surprising, 
since neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism broadly describe the aggressive 
dismantling, privatization, or retrenching of social safety net services and the 
constituent organizations and ideologies that support them at global, national, and local 
scales. The rise of a neoliberal political-economic consensus in the United States, and 
more specifically, within the municipal policies of urban centers in the United States, 
has risen at the expense of a political and policy consensus that promotes full 
employment and combats poverty. The loss of these substantial resources and the 
political weight they once carried has transformed a suite of large-scale and 
institutionalized safety net programs into one in which “temporary” or “emergency” 
measures are commonly used in lieu of longer-term commitments or strategies 
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(Benjamin 1969: p. 257, cited in DeFilippis et al 2010: p. 7). As Anthropologist Kim 
Hopper has argued,  
whatever their immediate value as instruments of relief, these measures fall far 
short of seeking to rectify—or even to address—the structural roots of poverty…. 
More pernicious still, they may have the effect of soothing the abrasion needed to 
motivate the search for a more lasting and inclusive solution” (p. 214, emphasis 
added). 
 
Since the 1980s when these trends began to be most visible at the national level, 
“politicized homeless mobilizations” (Wright 1997) have occurred in several cities 
across the country to elevate the discourse on poverty and homelessness beyond one of 
reform and minor policy adjustments to larger issues of wealth distribution, and the 
rights of poor people and people without shelter in the United States. I argue that the 
actions of Homeless Pride in Duncan Plaza are in keeping with this tradition, but as a 
result of the further consolidation of the system of neoliberal urbanism in the 21st 
century, Homeless Pride faced a more challenging political and economic environment 
than its predecessors in the 20th century. As such, this work contributes to this literature 
on politicized encampments by updating it to 21st century conditions reflecting the 
increased hegemony of this political-economic order.  
Others have no limited their critique of neoliberalism to broad changes in 
policymaking and political consensus. Within the realm of homelessness policy 
specifically, several authors note an increased focus on individual behavior 
modifications to recover from homelessness, rather than on larger structural issues that 
produce homelessness, as the state’s role in providing for the common good is 
subordinated to privatized and individually based remedies (Mitchell 2003: p. 179; 
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Wright 1997: p. 12). In the early 21st century, these practices for managing homelessness 
began to face increased scrutiny. These critiques are well-summarized in the passage 
from Anthropologist Vincent Lyon-Callo, below: 
[B]y failing to address systemic and discursive inequities, these efforts remain 
ineffective in decreasing homelessness. Education, life skills training, and self-
improvement efforts are of little real value without collective political 
movements making existing jobs pay living wages. Similarly, efforts to create 
affordable housing, while possibly being a solution to homelessness, will do 
nothing to eliminate poverty without social movements aimed at denaturalizing 
current dominant discourses about the ‘rights’ of capital and redistributing the 
nation’s wealth in a more equitable fashion (2004: p. 155).  
 
Others echo Lyon-Callo’s clarion call for a rights-based framework to address 
structural deficiencies of the neoliberal order. Geographer David Harvey argues that his 
essay on the “Right to the City” functions “both a working slogan and political ideal” 
(2008: p. 331). Others, such as Bratt, Stone, and Hartmann, use a human rights 
framework to fuse the issues of economic and housing security together “as a basis for a 
new social agenda” (2006: p. 414). But there are some slight differences between a 
human rights framework that addresses housing or economic rights in accordance with 
the UN Declaration on Human Rights. As Harvey asserts, 
[T]he right to the city is a far more than the individual liberty to access urban 
resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is moreover, a 
common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably 
depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the processes of 
urbanization (2008 p. 315).  
 
While calls for more organizing to “take back the city” proceed at the local level (and I 
do argue that Homeless Pride was a small and fleeting piece of the larger constellation 
of these urban movements), those who call for the redistribution of wealth and income 
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to address poverty are at the national scale are, at best, perceived as “utopian 
dreamers”, or at worst, declared socialists and locked out of any “serious” conversation 
on national policy. Simultaneously, within the homeless policy arena, those who build 
shelters and provide services are then “rewarded for contributing to solving 
homelessness”, while larger issues of “power, property, and poverty are subordinated 
to technocratic considerations of funding patterns, grant writing, and shelter 
management” (Wright 1997: p. 1).  
As Lyon-Callo further demonstrates in his case study of a shelter in 
Massachusetts, the persistence of these intractable conflicts in the realm of homelessness 
frustrate even those on the frontlines. Employees and homeless “clients” who have a 
more politicized analysis of their situation found it difficult to bring themselves to the 
level of political activism because of the way they are funded and supported by 
governments and foundations. Even in New Orleans, Mike Miller, Director of 
Supportive Housing for UNITY, told the local Times-Picayune newspaper that his job 
essentially boiled down to playing “cleanup for the whole, broken system" (Reckdahl 
2008). So as Lyon-Callo chronicles, unless caseworkers and other workers within this 
system find outside networks to channel their opinions, their “resistance remains an 
individual struggle” (2004: pp 153-155). The pervasive sense of frustration and 
hopelessness is not at all inexplicable. As he concludes,  
[g]iven the dominance of the bio-medical model, the rise of neoliberalism, and 
the perception of neoliberal globalization as a totalizing, all-encompassing 
system, it is not surprising that shelter staff, homeless people, and policy makers 
often have difficulty conceiving of what else they can do (ibid: p. 158).  
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This analysis calls further attention to the futility of addressing homelessness within 
even the most progressively minded municipal contexts. Drawing from his experience 
in the small liberal city of Amherst, Massachusetts, Lyon-Callo notes with some 
resignation and anger that “A ‘caring,’ ‘helping,’ community engaged in ‘reasonable’ 
helping efforts and charitable work, even in the ‘most enlightened’ city in 
Massachusetts, is not the answer if we hope to see an end to homelessness” (2004: p. 
173). In the next section, I problematize a rights-based framework to housing by 
shedding light on its potential role in perpetuating a cultural binary of housed versus 
homeless citizens.5  Through a theoretical analysis of “bare life”, I elaborate more on the 
political nature of homelessness, and the ways in which other scholars have approached 
politicized encampments such as Duncan Plaza. 
Bare Life and an Ethic of Dwelling 
 As Feldman asserts, “it is time to pry homelessness loose from its usual frame as 
a social problem” (2004: p. 15). If we plumb the cultural depths of our society with 
political theory, we uncover a set of assumptions about who “the homeless” are, and 
how these drive our policy responses, whether they seek to provide sanctuary or 
criminalize the presence of the homeless. He outlines a coupling of binary oppositions 
relating to the assumed agency of the homeless.  
The first, “free versus unfree,” (see Figure 1 below) relate to the assumptions of 
choice in homelessness, and whether a homeless person has had any active agency in 
                                                 
5 The word “citizen” is obviously charged with various meanings. I use it here 
cautiously, while also attempting to enlarge its meaning beyond its typically 
exclusionary definition as a naturalized member of a nation-state.  
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the production of their life circumstances. The second binary valuation, “sacred or 
profane,” ascribes a judgment to this agency. As such, a homeless person who possesses 
sacred freedom is the romanticized migrant “hobo” wanderer of cinematic and 20th 
century lore, while a homeless person with “sacred unfreedom” is the passive recipient 
of alms and compassion in the model of Judeo-Christian charity—a human with only 
“bare life” and nothing else. These cultural conceptions of homelessness promote the 
more liberal policy responses of service provision and shelter. Contrarily, the profane 
freedom and “unfreedom” of homelessness see the homeless person’s agency or 
passivity both as threats—one an active criminal threat, the other a visual and economic 
drain on society driven by behaviors of vice and slothfulness (Feldman 2004). 
Sacred Freedom:  
romantic, wandering “hobo”, should 
be allowed to exist in “natural” state 
Profane Freedom:  
homeless person is active threat to 
society through criminal actions, 
panhandling 
Sacred Unfreedom:  
passive recipient of charity, “client” of 
services. Often associated with 
religious invocations of “the poor” or 
“the needy” 
Profane Unfreedom:  
visual/economic drain on downtowns 
or spaces of consumption through 
mere presence, even without 
panhandling or criminal activity 
Figure 1 (adapted from Feldman 2004). 
The problem with all of these, argues Feldman, is that all of these classifications ignore 
the deeply political implications of these ascribed identities. Of principal importance to 
 22
Feldman is his assessment that “home-dwelling citizen and homeless bare life are 
political statuses, not only social statuses or elements of personal identity” (ibid: p. 20; 
emphasis added). Expanding on Agamben’s “homo sacer” or “sacred being” concept, 
Feldman argues that the political status of “bare life,” in which a human being is 
viewed as only the shell of a human being without a political identity or status, has 
been applied to the homeless and has served to strip them of even “the right to have 
rights” (quoting Arendt, in Feldman 2004: p. 21). This stripped down form of “bare life” 
has serious implications for the spectrum of likely policy outcomes for homelessness, 
because it significantly impacts the chances that people who have experienced or are 
experiencing homelessness will be able to participate on equal footing in the articulation 
of better outcomes. It is worth noting here that the practice of planning in the 20th 
century has had a role to play in establishing the “cultural norms concerning what 
constitutes a proper home,” and consequently, what does not (2004: p. 91).6 The 
implications of this binary of “the housed” and “the homeless” also complicate the 
normative visions of a “housing for all” political agenda. As Feldman argues,  
The dream of proper homes—even in its redistributive progressive form—is 
implicated in the production of ‘bare life’ when grand schemes for ending 
homelessness are based on the destruction or conversion of nonnormative [sic] 
dwellings such as residential hotels and collectively organized homeless 
encampments deemed ‘substandard housing’” (2004: p. 22) 
 
                                                 
6 While the full extent of the complicity of the practice of planning in the production of 
this dynamic is far beyond the scope of this paper, I note the the dynamic as a way to 
initiate a discussion of an alternative planning ethos or “ethic of dwelling” as Feldman 
describes it. 
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From a policymaking standpoint, as well as a political action and organizing 
perspective, the purpose of this critique is not to eschew movements for decent and 
affordable housing for all people. Rather, the purpose is to ensure that policymakers 
and organizers alike insist on policies that are developed “in a pluralistic spirit that 
avoids the production of an excluded bare life as the ‘other’ against which singular 
norms of home and home-dwelling citizen stand” (2004: p. 22). 7  Feldman identifies this 
working goal as an “ethic of dwelling” that promotes an acceptance and understanding 
of a multiplicity of dwelling forms and statuses. This ethic of dwelling, he argues, is a 
useful place to begin to consider policies aimed at ending homelessness because its 
purpose is to deconstruct the “home/homeless opposition” and recognize “our 
common engagement in the habits of dwelling” (2004: p. 147).  
Deeply connected to, and also in direct obstruction of, broadening our 
conception of the habits of dwelling is the powerful trend in the aestheticization of 
downtown redevelopment and politicized mobilizations of the homeless. In an effort to 
connect this invisibilizing force of neoliberal urbanism to the dynamic politics of 
“crisis” during the six-month Duncan Plaza encampment, I examine some of these 
literatures below. 
The Aesthetics of Neoliberalism: Homelessness in Downtowns  
                                                 
7 Feldman uses the terms “pluralistic” not to mean the traditional sense of a pluralistic 
society in which various interests articulate their positions on an imaginary equal 
playing field in the public sphere, but rather a political spirit that is encouraging and 
accepting of plurality, diversity, and nuance.  
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The importance of visible homelessness, as well as the political tensions over the 
intentional occupation of public space, has increased in recent years not only because of 
the growth in homelessness. The “power of aesthetics” in downtown revitalizations and 
the “landscaping” (sanitizing) of city life also draw this tension into greater relief 
(Mitchell 2003: pp. 185-6). Especially in the post-Katrina recovery context in New 
Orleans, many spaces, public and private, took on a greater symbolism because their 
status helped tell larger stories about the dramatic and tumultuous reconstruction of an 
already symbolic American city. This particular context gave further credence to 
Wright’s assertion that   
City redevelopment is not a given, but rather a highly strategic process subject to 
conflicting claims from a multitude of parties exercising differing degrees of 
power within a highly contested landscape, both culturally and economically. It 
is this struggle that cities actively work to conceal in their promotional literature, 
advertising, marketing, and boosterism designed to ‘sell the city’” (Wright 1997: 
p. 115). 
 
As part of an increasing trend in cities to monetize their downtowns for consumption-
based economic activity, public spaces in planned spaces of consumption are often 
subjected to increasingly stringent rules on comportment, appearance, and movement 
(Mitchell 2003, Vitale 2008). In the case of Duncan Plaza, in the heart of the Central 
Business District of New Orleans and adjacent to City Hall, one cannot discount the role 
that downtown business and tourism interests played in the armies of compassion that 
descended upon the Plaza in such great force in November of 2007. From the 
perspective of these city boosters, “Homelessness is both bad for business and bad for 
government” (Blau 1992: p. 111). Furthermore, Blau asserts that in these downtown 
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contexts, the relative political strength of the business community has been “the 
fundamental determinant of policies for the homeless” (ibid: p. 132).  As many scholars 
of public space argue, however, these often exclusionary consumption-based visions for 
downtown vitality—a “consumptive public sphere”—stands in contrast to a more 
“pluralizing conception of public space that fosters encounters with difference and 
what Richard Sennet calls ‘the visceral experience of freedom’”(Feldman 2004: p. 24). 
Thus the political tensions and disruptions that these politicized mobilizations create 
are about challenging an increasingly monolithic and consumerist vision for the future 
of cities.  Through the disruption of these social and physical spaces, new conditions, 
and thus new visions, can come to life.  
Politicized Mobilizations 
When viewed through the lens of politics and the development of cities, 
conceiving of homelessness as  “simply a problem for the department of human 
services or for charity ignores the role city officials, planners, and developers have in 
structuring city spaces that lead to the exclusion and repression of its poor” (Wright 
1997: p. 308).  Works that analyze spaces in which the homeless have re-activated or 
reasserted citizenship through politicized homeless encampments are low in quantity, 
but their insight into understanding the opportunities and constraints of Homeless 
Pride are valuable. 
As noted above, people who are homeless do not often find their voices being 
heard in policy discussions at the national level. While there are numerous factors 
contributing to this dynamic, there is a strong link between this dynamic of invisibility 
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and the way that people who are homeless are typically treated as clients and not 
citizens. Indeed, several scholars who have written on the topic of politicized 
mobilizations have identified that the fundamental challenge of addressing the 
injustices of homelessness is to establish citizenship (Feldman 2004: p. 86). Others have 
noted that neediness is no substitute for fundamental political identity; just because 
someone is lacking material resources does not mean he or she ceases to be occupied 
with personal freedom (Waldron in Feldman 2004: p. 79). Mitchell notes that beyond the 
fundamental importance of having a right to politically express oneself, there must be a 
space to do so. For the homeless, he argues, “only in public space can the homeless 
represent themselves as being a legitimate part of the public” (2003: p. 129). In these 
public spaces, the residents of these encampments are able to  
provide a very direct link between home-dwelling and civic involvement not 
only by making dwelling spaces into an experiment in collective self-governance 
but also by making this form of housing a very public act of witnessing a 
dramatization of housing inequalities in American society (Feldman 2004: p. 
136). 
 
Perhaps most key to the analysis that Feldman, Wright, Mitchell, and Hopper all 
share is their acceptance that, despite the normative necessity of the homeless self-
organizing for collective rights, they also acknowledge the modest gains that can be 
accomplished from such mobilizations. Feldman notes that some homeless 
encampments have positively impacted shelter policies or made improvements in the 
availability of financial resources for a locality. Indeed, the characterization of the 
shelter industry and of social workers as an “enemy” is often found in the critical 
literature, especially from Lyon-Callo and Feldman.  
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For example, Feldman and Lyon-Callo identify the “secret solidarity” between 
service providers and city and capital interests as significant constraint to local 
organizing efforts, since they believe these are “the very powers they ought to fight” 
(Feldman 2003: p. 19). As a result of these constraints, Feldman claims the most 
important contribution of these political mobilizations may be more difficult to 
quantify: “these encampments have enabled homeless persons to contest their outlaw 
status and to remake themselves as citizens” (2004: p. 103). Wright, in documenting two 
separate politicized mobilizations in the late 20th century in Chicago and San Jose, also 
noted other important achievements: 
For a brief period Tranquility City [Chicago] and the SHA [San Jose] 
encampment became a mini-movement area in which a different way of living 
poor was experimented with; a possibility was created for the formation of a 
homeless community free of institutional shelter restraints. (1997: pp. 296-7).  
 
Feldman and Wright both agree that this “different way” of living is among the more 
important outcomes of such struggles. As Wright argues, groups like Homeless Pride 
create “windows of opportunity for urban political work designed to reframe the 
debate of homelessness from one of individual pathology to one of land use” (1997 p. 
322). As he continues, these “mini-movement” spaces can provide rapid and effective 
temporary housing, as well as “the needed space to create resistant heterotopia” and 
call in to question the “proper” use of space as planners and politicians typically define 
it. (1997: pp. 226-228, 322). In successful politicized temporary encampments, Wright 
also notes that some residents feel a sense of pride and self-satisfaction for having 
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participated in something for the collective betterment of others beyond themselves 
(1997: p. 291).  
 Yet as Hopper notes, “success can impose costs of its own”, since most 
“victories” are “tainted by the demoralizing realization that one has once again settled 
for less than what is really needed—and fought for the privilege of doing so” (2003: p. 
183). Or as Mitchell succinctly notes, it is hard to “get excited about the right to beg” 
(2003: p. 210). Successful or effective leaders—just as rare if not more so among people 
who are homeless than in society at large—are also likely to convert any social capital 
from their position into a job or a housing opportunity, despite the collective nature of 
their struggle. As Hopper laments, “their personal gain is often the movement’s loss” 
(2003: p. 183). Mike Miller of UNITY also notes that because of the limited funding 
available to address homelessness and the “stop-loss” paradigm that constrains their 
work, outreach workers do not typically target those who are able to “self-advocate” for 
assistance (Miller interview 2011).  
Even with effective leadership and receptive government, Hopper laments that 
few demands, “no matter how brilliantly orchestrated, can touch the underlying 
mechanisms of deindustrialization, government cutbacks, and the depletion of low-
income housing” (2003: p. 183). The articulation of demands and the targets of these 
demands arose as a frequent issue in the Duncan Plaza encampment, and so finally, this 
work expands upon the growing body of literature on the tensions surrounding local 
organizing in increasingly globalized urban environments (Hess 2009; DeFilippis, et al 
2010).  
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A Note on Methods and Methodology 
My access to these events was built both on luck and a trust that I cultivated both 
accidentally and intentionally through my consistent presence in Duncan Plaza 
providing meals, rides, and as a member of a small “copwatch” contingent. However, I 
was not acting as a researcher at the time, so to go back and review footage and read 
news articles covering the events of the time is not only to examine the behavior of 
others but also myself. As such, my relationship falls outside of traditional participant-
observation, but could be more adequately described by terms such as  “hanging out”, 
“buddy researcher”, or even, hesitantly, “ardent activist” (Wright 1997: p. 2). 
 In the interest of full disclosure, I will outline here my participation in these 
events as fully as I can. After sleeping in Duncan Plaza with between half a dozen and a 
dozen activists on July 4th, 2007, I attended numerous planning meetings in the gazebo 
throughout the summer. Along with other volunteers, I cooked and helped serve a meal 
on every Monday evening from July until August or September, when it became every 
other Monday until finally our volunteer organization ran out of food supplies in 
October. I participated throughout the summer in the “copwatch” contingent, which 
consisted of mostly young, white, recent New Orleans arrivals like myself sitting on 
benches in the Plaza in groups of 2-4 between the hours of 10pm and6am, between five 
and seven nights a week, depending on our numbers. I bought several tents in the early 
fall as the number of residents in the Plaza grew, and I used my car to take people on 
trips to the convenience store, to political rallies, and to look at rental units. I became 
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friendly with several of the men in leadership, and occasionally contributed my 
thoughts on strategy, but almost exclusively kept my role to one of logistical support.  
The media I have collected is in the form of obtained verité and interview film 
footage from a documentary film project, news articles, and interviews I have 
conducted personally.  I communicated with the filmmakers (who were also colleagues 
of mine at the time) and described the footage I would be looking for. For a research fee, 
I was allowed to copy dozens of hours of footage as well as the log notes that came with 
them. These provided a basic context for the content of the files, which I then used as a 
basis for prioritizing which footage to transcribe and examine more closely. In addition, 
I reviewed an archive of dozens of news articles that I collected on the situation at 
Duncan Plaza in 2007, and used those articles to complement certain gaps in the video 
archive. I then conducted additional interviews from August 2011 to October 2011 with 
key activists and a UNITY employee to understand their perspective on the events in 
retrospect.  
Like any attempt to recoup memories and analysis of events past, my archive of 
interview subjects, transcripts, news articles, memories, and video materials is of course 
an incomplete patchwork. Furthermore, because of the nature of UNITY’s work as case 
managers for clients, my ability to access former members of Homeless Pride is limited 
by confidentiality regulations.8 As such, not only am I unable to locate them, I am also 
                                                 
8 Any names of Homeless Pride members mentioned throughout this work are available 
due to information obtained from non-privileged sources such as public meetings, 
video footage, and news articles. 
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unable to speculate as to whether or not they are still housed or if they have become 
homeless again in New Orleans or in some other city. 
In light of the above cautions against it, it would be rather naïve of me to 
presume that the dynamics of romanticizing some of the leaders of Homeless Pride 
(both for being homeless, but also for being black male activists) that Feldman and 
others identify have not also influenced my own views on the events of those months in 
2007 (2004: p. 107). Having been even just a sideline witness to the events of those six 
months, however, I think, rather than imbuing the residents of Duncan Plaza with some 
sacred identity, I saw how ordinary they were. In this case, I use the word ordinary 
neither to demean nor to place them on a pedestal: like anyone else, they are as human 
as they want and are allowed to be. In order to achieve some amount of personal 
stability, many in homeless pride leadership behaved hypocritically, engaged in 
favoritism, deceit, coercion, and other unsavory practices. To ignore this aspect of their 
lives would be to deny their basic organizing premise: that they too are human. Like 
tens of thousands of New Orleanians, they wanted to come home, and they were doing 
what they thought was necessary to achieve that goal. My purpose is to examine the 
successes and failures of a fleeting moment in time when our paths crossed, not to 
nominate them for sainthood.  
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III: The Operation Begins (July 2007 to September 2007) 
 
You don’t want to go to war/ 
with New Orleans/ 
just give us our homes and we’ll be alright! 
 
—Post-Katrina housing rally cry 
 
I WORK BUT CAN’T AFFORD HOUSING  
—Homeless Pride poster in Duncan Plaza 
 
 
The first few months of Homeless Pride illustrate several important themes. First 
and foremost is that the organizers and other allies who came into the space of Duncan 
Plaza pervasively used the language of crisis to help build momentum to grow the 
visibility of the encampment. While this framing helped draw an early contrast between 
the urgency of the housing situation in New Orleans with the seeming ineptitude of the 
Nagin administration, the repetition of this message over time had an unpredicted 
impact on the ultimate range of solutions the city considered in response to the 
problems Homeless Pride posed.  
The sharp contrast was crucial to quickly build up the size, and thus the political 
and symbolic muscle, of the encampment in Duncan Plaza. This drew homeless men, 
and very few women, to Duncan Plaza and offered a sense of greater safety in numbers 
as well as support and respect for the humanity and dignity of each individual’s right to 
participate as full citizens in the politics of their hometown. This was indeed an 
effective strategy—perhaps too effective—as it brought so much attention to Duncan 
Plaza that the city acted swiftly to diffuse the political implications of dozens of tents on 
the front steps of City Hall.  
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*** 
 After attending the first ever United States Social Forum in Atlanta in June of 
2007, housing organizers from the People’s Hurricane Relief Fund (PHRF), returned to 
New Orleans with the idea to form a public encampment of at the steps of City Hall to 
bring their grievances directly to the administration of Mayor C. Ray Nagin. The PHRF 
was a black socialist organization formed in the wake of the levee breaches to organize 
the black working classes of New Orleans for a racially and economically just 
reconstruction. The Gulf Coast delegation received special attention at the historic 
meeting not only because of the conference site’s proximity to the Gulf Coast, but also 
because the organizing struggles of the post-Katrina context were still commanding 
national solidarity and attention. Gathering strength from the energy and support of 
others, the organizers envisioned an encampment of public housing and private market 
tenants, as well as the homeless. 
Less than two years after the levee breaches that occurred during Hurricane 
Katrina, the housing situation in New Orleans remained dire. Over 80% of the city had 
flooded, causing an estimated loss of 80,000 rental units, including the closure of 
thousands of public housing apartments that were relatively undamaged by the 
hurricane (Fernandez 3/29/07). Because of the shortage in supply, rents rose markedly 
in certain neighborhoods (Eaton 2007) As a result of the structuring of federal recovery 
dollars, relief was mostly available to homeowners, but not to renters, despite the fact 
that pre-Katrina, New Orleans was a majority-renter city (GCR 2010). As such, PHRF 
had initiated a tenants working group for organizing private market tenants, as well as 
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working with Survivor’s Village and the People’s Organizing Committee, both public 
housing resident groups and their allies. The plan for an encampment in front of City 
Hall was to organize the people who were homeless in the city, but also to unite all 
three elements of the housing movement into one united front (see also Duncan Plaza 
fliers Appendix A).  
Echoing the famous Frederick Douglass statement “What to the slave is the 
fourth of July?” PHRF organizers targeted July 4th as a kickoff date and built the event 
around the theme of asking “what is the fourth of July to a homeless person or poor 
person?” (Juakali 7/4/2007). The site was additionally significant because of its 
proximity to Essence Festival, one of the largest tourism draws for New Orleans, in 
which tens of thousands of mostly black visitors come to New Orleans for an annual 
concert and festivities. This strategic timing and location was designed to challenge the 
narrative of recovery and the economic activities that went with it. As the press 
gathered for the morning press conference, displaced residents from public housing, the 
tenants’ right working group, the homeless, and other leaders and organizers, including 
Mtangulizi Sanyika of the African-American Leadership Project, spoke on the topic of 
housing instability and injustice in the post-Katrina landscape. The press conference 
also included a solidarity delegation of activists from Tsunami-affected villages in 
Thailand, who were meeting with housing activists in New Orleans during that week. 
Malcolm Suber, lead organizer for the PHRF, advised the press that the message of the 
encampment—which was not intended to last longer than a few days—was that there 
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was a severe housing problem in the city and that “New Orleans is not alright” (Suber 
7/4/11).  
Planning for the future of the encampment was a dynamic and unpredictable 
process. The organizers had to balance their hopes for a sustained encampment and 
strong numbers with unpredictable levels of support for the action: encampments 
require lots of bodies and are logistically demanding on activist organizations. There 
was also the ever-present threat of the National Guard or New Orleans Police 
Department (NOPD) making mass arrests and confiscating tents and posters, an action 
authorities in New Orleans had taken previously.9 Thus while the stated goal was to 
make demands to local officials in favor of long-term structural changes and policies, 
the ever-present threat of the termination of the camp fostered a constant underlying 
ambience of urgency to the duration of the Duncan Plaza encampment.  
Organizers faced many challenges both at the beginning as well as near the end 
of the encampment in November/December 2007. After the fanfare of the July 4th press 
conference dissipated, and the afternoon rains set in, the occupation of the Plaza was 
reduced to fewer than half a dozen activists—none of them public housing tenants or 
homeless residents. While a few homeless people did sleep in the gazebo that night 
after an evening meal was provided, organizers and activists awoke the morning of July 
                                                 
9 This expectation was grounded in the events of a previous action, known as 
Resurrection City, in which symbolic wooden shelters were constructed in the Gentilly 
neighborhood on the median adjacent to the St. Bernard public housing development in 
March of 2007 to represent the ongoing displacement of public housing residents. These 
makeshift symbolic shelters were deconstructed and removed by City employees 
within one week of their construction. They were never occupied. 
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5th to a dozen empty tents, and declared the action a failure, despite a successful press 
conference the previous day.  Indeed, Endesha Juakali, a PHRF organizer and one of the 
leaders of the planning for the encampment, declared that morning that he would 
“never try an encampment again” after the failure of that morning, which he likened to 
“charging at windmills” (Juakali 7/5/11). The rapidity with which the action had gone 
from success to failure was a persistent source of anxiety for the remainder of the 
existence of the encampment, as those who slept in the Plaza from the beginning saw 
how quickly their efforts could evaporate.  
Out of the frustration and failure of that morning, organizers and activists 
returned to the Plaza that evening for a meeting to discuss what, if anything, might 
become of the action that had taken place the previous day. At the meeting that 
evening, Suber and Juakali both admitted that the planning for the July 4th event was 
insufficient, but that a logical action would be to continue to use the Plaza as a space to 
build a homeless movement since homelessness could be seen as a possible outcome of 
other housing issues and instability (7/5/07).  
Larry Franklin, a homeless New Orleanian, mentioned that the lack of police 
harassment allowed the few non-activists who had occupied the Plaza the previous 
night to sleep better because they felt safer with others around. Mr. Franklin further 
argued that the Plaza would fill up quickly if people thought police might not harass 
them. Other attendees, including David Nolbert, a homeless New Orleanian who had 
grown up in public housing and would eventually become a leader of Homeless Pride, 
agreed, “if you get enough tents, we’ll get the people” (ibid). It was this set of comments 
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that prompted Suber to declare that the Plaza should be declared a  “free zone” for the 
homeless to gather, live, and sleep, without fear of harassment.  
By July 9th, less than one week later, the central gazebo in Duncan Plaza was the 
residence of over a dozen people, mostly black men from the generally working-class 
6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th wards of New Orleans. Volunteers provided meals at 6pm, and 
during these times the Plaza attracted dozens more who didn’t reside in the Plaza but 
came for the meal. Some would stay for the meeting that followed, but most did not.  
This would become a recurring tension throughout the existence of the 
encampment, as those would be become the leadership of Homeless Pride insisted as 
early as July 10th that meals be served after the organizing meeting in order to 
discourage people from arriving for a meal and then departing. As the leadership 
became more solidified and confident, they also became increasingly adamant that any 
goods, such as shelter or a meal, should not be given without requiring participation in 
organizing meetings and events. These tensions persisted throughout the entire 
duration of the occupation of the park, as organizers and Homeless Pride leaders 
weighed the importance of maintaining a politicized space against the symbolic 
importance of maintaining a space with many dozens of people. In the first weeks, 
PHRF printed over a thousand leaflets, and an initial unifying task for the group was to 
take a handful of fliers and pass them out to other homeless people at shelters 
throughout the city. This active outreach helped grow the presence in the Plaza quickly, 
and by July 16th—less than two weeks after the July 4th press conference—attendance at 
evening meetings in the gazebo numbered between 30 and 40.  
 38
This new growth was absorbed through meetings several times a week, and 
every general meeting began the same way: everyone gathered in a circle, someone led 
the group in prayer, and every single person introduced themselves and their reason for 
being there. These dynamics promoted an egalitarian atmosphere, as well as allowed 
the residents of the Plaza to provide support to each other in the form of applause after 
introductions. Early meetings were also the most structured, as they were crucial for 
establishing a set of working political goals and the space’s intent. This would have 
both positive and negative consequences over time, as it allowed for those with less 
political education or background to quickly learn the political analysis that the 
organizers provided, but it also meant that any shortcomings in messaging would be 
compounded through its repetition among the Plaza residents. 
 In the first two weeks, Plaza residents made sanitary facilities a key agenda item, 
and advocated for petitioning the city for a group of portable toilets. Others asked for 
cleaning supplies to keep the gazebo and surrounding areas clean in the absence of 
proper sanitation facilities (7/10/07). Cleanliness also applied to behavior as well. Mr. 
Nolbert as well as Steve Wheeler, a former Black Panther and resident of the 9th ward, 
both attempted to convince other Plaza residents that the best way to keep the space 
safe from police harassment was not to give the police any reason to invade the space, 
such as violent behavior, public drunkenness or drug use. These statements were not 
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made in a purist or evangelist manner, however: the common refrain was simply to 
“just take that somewhere else” (ibid).10 
 Before PHRF organizers introduced the need to choose political targets, Larry 
Boyle, a former resident of the Lower 9th ward, made repeated impassioned speeches to 
the group about needed to take the fight “across the street” in City Hall (ibid). In 
organizing meetings, Suber made repeated reference to presenting city employees with 
a visual “crisis that they can’t escape,” as well as forcing the city to confront “how 
they’re gonna solve this homeless crisis, how they’re going to solve this affordable 
housing crisis” (ibid). The consistent and early use of the word crisis framed Homeless 
Pride’s messaging.  
City Hall was not the only target in early discussions. Conflict began almost 
immediately with the sheltering industry in the city, when several homeless men 
explained at a meeting that a well-known men’s shelter had prohibited a group of them, 
including Malcolm Suber, from passing out fliers about Duncan Plaza around the 
property. This allowed other Plaza residents to air their complaints about shelter 
conditions, but also to voice their criticisms of the sheltering business overall. Suber also 
added that while shelters were about people who are in crisis, “the people out here 
stand for housing as a human right” (7/10/07). While this type of messaging clearly 
resonated with most meeting attendees, large-scale critiques such as human rights were 
                                                 
10 This is also not meant to imply that the park was a drug- or alcohol-free space—
merely that the leaders of Homeless Pride maintained a public message of keeping it 
that way. 
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articulated less frequently and forcefully over time as short-term concerns continued to 
occur and recur.  
At the meeting on July 16th, over a dozen men interested in leadership roles with 
Juakali and Suber to review a document outlining points of unity that had been drafted 
by a smaller group over the weekend at the nearby PHRF office. This working group 
model was characteristic of a trend over the first two months, as the agenda items in 
general meetings shifted from immediate concerns of defending territory to growing 
intra-group identification and solidarity and articulating a set of demands to local 
political leaders.  
Other important interactions also took place during these early weeks. On July 
10th, Sam Scaffini, a Police Technician from the NOPD’s Homelessness Assistance 
Collaborative stopped by the gazebo during a meeting as an invited guest. He provided 
off-the-cuff information about the status of certain shelters in the city, while also 
acknowledging that human beings also had “human rights” to shelter and food and 
that this encampment would hopefully yield positive results on that front. He also 
added that the park’s residents were likely to experience less harassment because the 
police officers and others in power had all recently experienced the vulnerability of 
temporary homelessness and displacement, even if only for a few weeks, and that this 
would likely foster a more supportive environment in the city for the encampment, 
rather than harsh repression or arrests (7/10/07).  
This early and high profile interaction may have also affected Homeless Pride’s 
strategy over time, as they operated under the assumption that the public goodwill that 
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Mr. Scaffini was describing could only last for so long until the sympathy of public 
opinion vanished and the city brought the police into to dismantle the space. This 
added to the perception that the organizers and leaders were operating in a time-
sensitive atmosphere in which the greatest visibility had to be gained in the shortest 
period of time, despite their longer-term goals to build a rights-based movement for 
housing and economic justice in the city. 
While the residents of Duncan Plaza who had invited Mr. Scaffini appreciated 
his support and applauded his presence, Juakali reiterated that the goal of the 
encampment was to “go over this guy’s head” to affect city policy, so that Scaffini could 
do the “good things” that he clearly wanted to do to be a part of helping the homeless 
(ibid). In this case, city policies referred to an end to arrests of those sleeping in public 
places for crimes of “trespassing” as well as advocating for policies that allowed those 
without homes to occupy vacant buildings and/or to be employed in the construction 
of new houses in the New Orleans area.  
While there is no doubt that the city had the legal authority to advocate such 
policies, the point Juakali made in urging the residents of Duncan Plaza to think bigger 
and go “over this guy’s head” rarely went above the level of the city. The state and 
federal institutions and actors above the Mayor’s “head” were usually missing from 
discussions in Duncan Plaza. The absence of this framing is of particular note because 
both Mr. Suber and Mr. Juakali were part of a local organizing coalition that sought to 
prevent the demolition of thousands of units of public housing. During discussions in 
these meetings, and at rallies and marches against the demolition of public housing, the 
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question of scaled demands was often very clear: the federal government as well as the 
local government needed to be pressured and targeted. Yet the only time when 
Homeless Pride ever picketed in front of the Federal building in downtown New 
Orleans was in support of public housing residents—not for their own messaging on 
homelessness in New Orleans.  
 In support of changing city policy, Suber and a group of residents of Duncan 
Plaza attended a City Council Housing Subcommittee meeting the following week 
(7/16/07). At the debriefing meeting in the Plaza that evening, Suber informed the 
larger group that their message to the subcommittee was that the objective of those in 
the Plaza “isn’t just to end police harassment, [but] the objective is to make this space a 
symbol of the crisis of homelessness in this city.” The implication was that 
homelessness during this period was a crisis while it was not a crisis before Katrina. The 
implication that mass homelessness was a crisis, rather than a way of life in capitalist 
societies, also ran counter to the argument that the predominantly Marxist organizers in 
PHRF would typically make. While these relatively minor internal inconsistencies 
served no immediate harm, in aggregate they contributed to and reflected the larger 
context of crisis in New Orleans. 
 Regardless of these nuances, energy in the space continued to be strong in these 
early days. There were occasional discussions that were critical of the role of emergency 
sheltering services. Mr. Boley argued to the group that while certain shelters like the 
New Orleans Mission has been helpful to people from time to time, “its time for 
something new…we’re fighting for housing now. Those places don’t want you to be 
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independent” (7/16/07). Within a week of this steering committee meeting , residents 
of the Plaza were running meetings without Mr. Suber’s presence and guidance, and by 
the end of July they had decided on the name Homeless Pride. 
The month of August 2007 witnessed several key rallies and pickets in front of 
official buildings such as City Hall and the Section 8 office of the New Orleans Housing 
Authority (HANO). These rallies were at times composed of Homeless Pride members 
and a few activists and supporters (8/15/07), and at other times in conjunction with 
resident-activists from public housing (8/6/07). In front of City Hall, several members 
of Homeless Pride, including Leroy Miles, Jr., David Nolbert, and Robert Wells made 
the repeated statement that despite working—Mr. Wells, for example, worked as a 
bouncer in the French Quarter and also at the Riverwalk as a custodian—that they 
could not afford rent. Both in front of City Hall and outside the Housing Authority 
offices, they demanded the immediate re-opening of thousands of shuttered public 
housing apartments for those in need of shelter and those displaced/evicted from the 
developments by Hurricane Katrina. This month leading up to the second anniversary 
of Hurricane Katrina (August 29th, 2007) was a critical time for displaying the tone and 
potential power of having a politically motivated corps of homeless (mostly) men living 
in front of City Hall.11 By continuously picketing and speaking to the media both on 
their own and in conjunction with other housing activists, they attracted mostly positive 
                                                 
11 I have no intention of invisibilizing the presence and role that women played in 
supporting the work of Homeless Pride, but the omnipresence and cultivation of black 
male leadership made for a highly gendered space. Though articulating a vision for a 
radical transformation in housing rights and distribution, the roles and responsibilities 
of the various supporters and organizers were easily identifiable within traditional roles 
of race, gender, and class. The black mothers and grandmothers who were displaced 
from public housing ended up cooking for the mostly male tent city occupants, while 
white supporters worked as “copwatch” volunteers, etc. 
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media attention to their cause. In aligning their messaging in support of public housing, 
however, Homeless Pride members also complicated their efforts to have city officials 
understand their separate demands, which while linked, were not as federally targeted 
and motivated as those of public housing. 
While the month of August was an important month for showcasing the political 
potential of Homeless Pride, it was simultaneously a time of dwindling numbers in the 
Plaza because of the oppressive August heat and a loss of direct support from PHRF, 
which was organizing an international tribunal on human rights abuses committed in 
New Orleans in the two years since Katrina.12 The population of Duncan Plaza 
dwindled dramatically towards the second anniversary of Katrina, with a low point of 
approximately 12-15 full-time residents by the end of the month—essentially the same 
numbers as during the first week in July. Meeting schedules stalled and provided meals 
also became less frequent. Morale was extremely low among the occupants who 
remained. Organizers again became concerned, as they had on the morning of July 5th, 
that their efforts to display strength in numbers in a strategically visible space were 
coming undone. This concern on the immediate survival of the encampment adversely 
impacted the ability of the leadership to maintain a focus on longer-term critiques and 
messaging. 
By the beginning of September, Malcolm Suber had entered into a special 
election for a city council seat opening to be decided on October 20th, which also 
temporarily drew some focus away from Homeless Pride’s core issues onto his 
campaign. The efforts to prevent the demolition of thousands of public housing 
                                                 
12 Within 6 weeks after the tribunal in the final days of August, PHRF officially folded 
as an organization due to a collapse in their funding. 
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apartments, which I discuss in the next chapter, also consumed the energies of 
Homeless Pride leadership, who advocated to re-open public housing alongside 
housing and human rights activists.  
The above analysis demonstrates that throughout the summer, any foreseeable 
outcome of the encampment in Duncan Plaza remained tremendously unpredictable 
and highly contingent upon multiple dynamic variables—the “unpredictabilities” that 
Zupan describes (2011). While there was a conscious effort to deploy a narrative of crisis 
and urgency to draw a contrast with the perceived inaction and incompetence of the 
Nagin administration, the potential effects of this strategy on the long-term success of 
the encampment were not clear during this period.  
The consequences became clearer in the fall of 2007 when homeless service 
providers became involved. Throughout the summer and fall of 2007, both the Nagin 
administration and City Council began to see the urgent political problems that the 
encampment presented. As they continued to use the language of “constraint” to deflect 
accountability for their actions (as well as their inaction) on Homeless Pride’s demands, 
the city simultaneously and hypocritically began to use the resources and means at their 
disposal to ramp up efforts to disperse the growing and increasingly visible 
encampment at their doorstep. It is to that time period that I now turn. 
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IV: Stitching Up (September to December 2007) 
 
Food is good. Clothes is good.  Y’all my family, you know. But I get so upset as soon as they put 
up some food or some bags, y’all break your neck and run for it.  But we don’t break our neck and 
run for the cause. 
 
—Julius Nelson, Homeless Pride (November 2007) 
 
 
The city just wanted it out of the way. I get it, they have bigger problems. The problem is you do 
that—it doesn’t solve the problem. It just pushes them away.…Duncan Plaza wasn’t the sickest 
of the sick, but more time would have probably helped. But there wasn’t an infrastructure in 
place. The state was gonna do what they were gonna do. I’m not convinced they needed to fence 
it off. They wanted to clear the space and do it like yesterday.  
 
–Mike Miller, UNITY (August 2011) 
 
 
 The previous chapter detailed the rise of Homeless Pride’s message of urgency. 
This chapter illustrates the implications of that strategy—both in terms of foreseen and 
unforeseen outcomes. These events in Duncan Plaza careened towards the holiday 
season of 2007 in a period of relatively high levels of public frustration and anger in the 
city of New Orleans. As the weather cooled in September, Duncan Plaza and Homeless 
Pride underwent an unforeseen and rapid resurrection as a prominent public space 
(Saulny 2007; Reckdahl 2007). Through the fall, the linkages between the struggle to re-
open public housing and “end” homelessness in New Orleans continued to become 
increasingly intertwined, confusing the immediate “crisis” of the demolition of public 
housing with the perpetual “crisis” of chronic mass homelessness. In light of these 
increasing linkages and frustrations in dealing with elected officials, Homeless Pride 
members were left mostly to their own devices as their supporters were pulled away to 
confront the impending demolition of public housing. The range of options available to 
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Homeless Pride in the increasing confusion of December 2007 continued to narrow, and 
the decision to shutter the Plaza and end the conversation about conditions that 
produce homelessness and poverty had been made. 
*** 
Despite having built a relatively stable core of 3-5 leaders over the course of the 
summer months, Homeless Pride remained deeply reliant on a broad network for 
supporters and allies for logistical and organizational support. During the fall of 2007, 
the entire city of New Orleans became engrossed in a highly polarizing debate about 
the imminent demolition of several thousands public housing units that the federal 
government (falsely) claimed had been irreparably damaged by Hurricane Katrina. This 
threat to affordable housing drew away the energies and efforts many of the same 
organizers and supporters upon which Homeless Pride depended.  Perhaps not 
coincidentally, the city and charitable organizations took note of the absence of these 
activists and became more heavily involved in providing goods and services to the 
growing population of Duncan Plaza. Homeless Pride had publically condemned and 
resisted these throughout the previous months, and the presence of their supporters 
had helped reinforce this message. 
 The increased presence of Church groups and individuals offering charitable 
items contributed to the pre-existing tension between the leaders of Homeless Pride and 
those who simply wanted to live in the Plaza without being political activists. Yet it 
simultaneously generated an encouraging sense among the leaders of Homeless Pride 
that their actions were penetrating the public consciousness and having an impact on 
the city (11/8/07). By November, the activity in the Plaza was the subject of a front-
page article on Homeless Pride in the Times-Picayune, the New Orleans daily 
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newspaper, on November 8th, 2007 (Reckdahl 2007). The month of November also 
witnessed the launch of a short-lived blog and Facebook page for Homeless Pride 
(“Homeless Pride” 2007).  
 In an evening meeting after the publication of the article, Malcolm Suber came 
down to the Plaza to meet with Julius Nelson and other members of Homeless Pride 
about the increasing attention on the space. Suber and Nelson both delivered 
impassioned speeches about the need for unity and caution since the stakes of their 
actions were now front page news. Mr. Nelson warned the assembled crowd that the 
city was waiting for them to “screw up” and wanted to make the homeless look lazy 
and not worthy of assistance. 13 His rhetoric continued to press the consistent themes of 
sanitation and no drug use in the immediate area of the Plaza, as well as the need for 
daily agitation and pickets in front of City Hall:  
People shouldn’t be living out here in tents and on the grass, while the man sits 
on the 2nd floor and does nothing about it.  And the only way they’re going to 
understand and take notice is if we bind together and start protesting and 
marching on these people daily.  And doing what we need to do to allow our 
voice to be heard. …We got to stay the course, we got to let them know we are 
serious.  That we are willing to be packaged up and put in a paddy wagon and 
go to jail for this cause.  This cause has to be known it can no longer be swept up 
underneath the rug and ignored, we got to let our voices be heard. Secondly, we 
got to start conducting ourselves, listen, you’re on the front of the Times 
Picayune, you’re on every news channel in the city. You are public now, news 
reporters and cameras are out here daily.  We got to learn out to conduct 
ourselves, including myself, in a manner to prove [sic]. (11/8/07)  
 
                                                 
13 An example of this was clarified in the day’s article, as Ms. Reckdahl asked Homeless 
Pride leaders to comment on rumors that all of the tents that began to appear in Duncan 
Plaza in October had been donated, and not purchased by the Plaza’s residents 
themselves. In response, several members of Homeless Pride produced receipts for their 
tents, while noting that some had indeed been donated.  
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Along with the elevated stature of Homeless Pride in the public discourse, Nelson’s 
charisma as a leader also imbued some in Homeless Pride, as well as their supporters, 
with a sense that the message of the occupation of Duncan Plaza could begin to have a 
significant impact on the city. The narrative of their action shifted to a sense having 
accomplished one of their major goals: to place the “crisis” of homelessness and 
housing at the front of the city’s agenda. As much as Mr. Nelson used the front-page 
article as a cautionary tale of the ongoing necessity of discipline and respectable 
behavior, it was also a moment of increased energy and optimism that their action, now 
going on several months, was penetrating the psyche of elected officials.  
 This energy, however, was not successfully parlayed into action. At the 
conclusion of this meeting, the group decided to engage in a two-hour picket the 
following morning from 8 am to 10 am, while acknowledging that those who work at 
that time could not participate. What followed the next morning illustrated the divide 
between the politicized members of Homeless Pride and the general population of the 
Plaza who had less or no political associations with their residence in the space.  
 By 9am on November 9th, those ready to picket numbered fewer than ten. After 
20 minutes of walking through the Plaza with a megaphone urging other Plaza 
residents to come down for a rally, Rob Wells and Tyrone Collins began calling for a 
“feed up”—which was their way of saying that charitable donations of food had 
arrived. Ten minutes later, with nearly two-dozen confused Plaza residents standing 
with them, the Homeless Pride leaders led the group, some grumbling over the minor 
deception, across the street to begin the picket in front of City Hall. Later that day, after 
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the conclusion of the picket, David Nolbert commented on the tremendous growth in 
the number of residents at Duncan Plaza, but noted, as Mr. Nelson and Mr. Wells did, 
that the increased numbers had not always resulted in larger protests for housing 
(11/9/07). This ongoing tension with apolitical Plaza residents may have had the 
impact of increasing the political analysis of some of the members of Homeless Pride, as 
the following remark from David Nolbert, a Plaza resident since early July, 
demonstrates: 
We have to recognize these things that are happening in this city.  This should 
show the whole world what is happening, what our federal government, local 
and state governments are about.  It’s about money. You don’t have no money, 
you don’t get no honey. That’s the bottom line (11/9/07). 
 
This type of rhetoric, suggesting more of an anti-capitalist framework, was not typically 
heard in meetings in the early days of Homeless Pride. Yet it seems that in the face of 
continued apathy from other Plaza residents and what they perceived as a lack of 
respect from local politicians, some in Homeless Pride actually developed a greater 
analysis of their political and economic status. Although without access to these 
individuals it is impossible to determine precisely how or why their understanding of 
their situation may have changed, but the rhetoric among several leading Homeless 
Pride members transformed. 
 In mid-November 2007, just ten days after the picketing, three representatives 
from Homeless Pride including David Nolbert and Julius Nelson again presented their 
case to the City Council Housing Committee. Statements that day focused on the 
willingness of Homeless Pride to work with the city and other agencies to forge a 
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“common ground solution” to the problem of homelessness. Since they were speaking 
before a local government body, their words were designed to be of the greatest 
relevance to their local context. In his introduction, Julius Nelson described Homeless 
Pride as: 
an organization of and for the chronically homeless as well as those who have 
had changing living conditions post-Katrina. We are made up entirely of 
individuals who are or once were homeless. Homeless Pride wants the mayor 
and city council to know that Homeless Pride is a separate sector of Duncan 
Plaza (Nelson 11/19/07).   
 
Nelson also made the issue of inclusion of people who are homeless into decision-
making a key point of his remarks: 
 
Our request is that the agencies that represent, along with the city council, city 
leaders, and advocates of the homeless, include Homeless Pride and partner with 
us, come together with us and join resources with us, that we may be able to 
provide the best assistance available, to meet the needs and issues of the 
homeless (ibid). 
 
While the three men from Homeless Pride received some warm words of gratitude and 
encouragement from Councilperson Cynthia-Willard Lewis, the men noted after the 
meeting adjourned Councilperson Stacy Head, the other member of the committee, 
walked out in the middle of their allotted time. While it is common for councilpersons 
to come and go at certain points during public hearings, the representatives from 
Homeless Pride took this gesture as a sign of intentional disrespect and furthered their 
opinion that the city government was not interested in working with them to develop a 
long-range local plan to end homelessness in New Orleans (11/19/07).   
 The most critical aspect of the fall revolved around forces that were outside of 
the control of the city, Homeless Pride, or UNITY. What occurred cannot be fully 
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explained without elaborating on the surrounding context of the impending demolition 
of thousands of public housing apartments in New Orleans. Activism around the public 
housing demolition occupied much of the attention of the media and city council 
throughout November and December 2007. This was a result of decisions from the 
Secretary of HUD at the time, Alphonso Jackson, in 2006 and 2007, to demolish 
thousands of public housing apartments grouped in four large housing complexes 
throughout the city of New Orleans and replace them with privatized mixed-income 
communities in line with federal policies to deconcentrate poverty.  
 For approximately 18 months, the issue of demolition was framed in terms of the 
“right of return” for public housing residents, rather than being evicted/displaced by 
mandatory order and only being allowed apply to return to new mixed-income 
developments. The prospect of demolition became more and more certain in October 
2007, when a class-action lawsuit that had been filed on behalf of displaced residents 
was dismissed from federal court. In early December 2007, attorneys for the displaced 
residents discovered a local legal loophole that would require the New Orleans City 
Council to approve the demolition that the federal government and developers eagerly 
awaited. A final hearing scheduled for December 20th resulted in the forced ejection of, 
as well as the use of tasers and pepper spray on, anti-demolition protestors both inside 
and outside council chambers. The vote was 7-0 in favor of demolition. The next 
morning, Duncan Plaza was fenced off. 
 The issues of Homeless Pride and the anti-demolition coalition became so 
intertwined not only because of their relationship as issues of housing for vulnerable 
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people, but also as part of a larger coalition of groups who asserted that rebuilding 
policies in New Orleans were being designed to limit the return of New Orleanians who 
were poor and black. While many falsely understood this linkage as an assertion on the 
part of activists that those displaced/evicted from public housing were themselves 
victims of homelessness, the purpose of the linked messages was to draw a wider 
understanding of housing instability in New Orleans. Despite this, as Homeless Pride 
leaders such as Julius Nelson, Rob Wells, and David Nolbert continued to appear 
alongside public housing activists at City Hall and other symbols of government power, 
this linkage was used as an excuse to delegitimize the demands of both Homeless Pride 
and the Coalition to Stop the Demolition: if the activists could be shown to not be in 
proper command of the facts of their own situation, their grievances would be easier to 
dismiss.14  
 The sense of urgency that surrounded the campaign to stop the demolition of 
public housing also injected itself into Homeless Pride’s daily affairs. Rumored threats 
of mass arrests and dislocation (Reckdahl 2007; Suber 11/8/07) continued to keep 
Homeless Pride trapped in a mindset of short-term strategy, despite their persistent 
desire to articulate a message of larger structural vision. As the holidays approached 
and outside activists became occupied with the threat posed to public housing, 
Homeless Pride leaders were increasingly left to their own devices and make their own 
choices about who to trust and who to target. Given the distractions of their allies in the 
housing activist community and their frustrations in dealing with elected officials, the 
                                                 
14 See photo in Appendix B as evidence of this interwoven messaging. 
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remaining leadership of Homeless Pride made the decision to work with the only 
remaining actor that seemed to care about housing the homeless (even temporarily) and 
thus worth collaborating with: UNITY.  
 Homeless Pride leaders engaged in an ongoing feedback process with 
caseworkers about who had been out in the Plaza for the longest and who in their 
opinion deserved housing priority. These estimations often conflicted with UNITY 
guidelines for priority housing, which are based on a series of mortality indices not on 
political connections and commitment to an organization or cause. In final weeks of the 
Duncan Plaza encampment, this was a persistent tension between Homeless Pride and 
UNITY, but one that was subsumed by the urgency of relocation that larger institutions 
had placed on both parties (Mike Miller interview 2011). 
 On December 5th, the state of Louisiana told the city of New Orleans that it 
would be fencing off Duncan Plaza within one week to demolish a long-empty state 
building that abutted the northern edge of Duncan Plaza.  This move was met with 
skepticism from UNITY, Homeless Pride, housing activists, and even some members of 
the media, who questioned the sudden urgency of a plan to demolish a building that 
had been vacant for over two years. Representing the city and service providers, 
Councilmember Stacy Head, typically not the most supportive Councilperson for 
Homeless Pride, addressed the sudden urgency of the plan with some skepticism: 
‘The architects have not even settled on a particular design,’ Head said. ‘So I 
don’t see what the rush is. Why we can’t push this back two or three weeks to 
allow UNITY, the mission, and some other groups that are working actively to 
get emergency shelter beds’ (“Plaza Demolition Looms…” 2007).  
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This revelation decimated the momentum that Homeless Pride had cultivated amidst 
less-than-optimal circumstances during the month of November. The situation 
immediately changed from building partnerships to a sense of desperation, bitterness, 
and confusion. During the final week of the Duncan Plaza encampment, the support of 
outside activists withered as most of them were engaged in highly publicized acts of 
civil disobedience and rallies to prevent the public housing demolitions. Homeless 
Pride’s linkages with the anti-demolition coalition had withered as they became focused 
almost exclusively on the daily comings-and-goings of UNITY caseworkers and others 
who were working to clear Duncan Plaza now at a fever pitch. 
During the final week of the encampment, Julius Nelson remarked with 
resignation that while it was good that at least 150 people were being moved into 
various forms of temporary and supportive housing, but “when you consider the 
enormity of the problem we have, it’s really like a small chip” (12/16/07). He also 
asserted that Homeless Pride would move with others several blocks away to the new 
gathering site of the still homeless, under the elevated highway at the intersection of 
Claiborne Avenue and Canal Street. Once they received temporary housing assistance, 
however, Homeless Pride members usually only made brief visits in 2008 to the 
Canal/Claiborne camp. Their presence as a political and organizing force evaporated. 
 On the final day of clearing the Plaza, December 21st, 2007, David Nolbert paced 
in the background of the UNITY press conference, musing with frustration that, for all 
the organizations that Ms. Kegel was praising and thanking, Homeless Pride was 
notably absent from her list. He snuck up alongside a homeless man that UNITY had 
seemingly chosen randomly to speak to the press, and as the man addressed the media 
and thanked UNITY for placing him in an apartment, Mr. Nolbert whispered in his ear 
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that he should mention Homeless Pride, because, in his opinion, without Homeless 
Pride, none of this would have happened. After concluding what seemed to be his 
rehearsed remarks, the man added somewhat hesitantly, after a pause, that he wished 
to thank and acknowledge Homeless Pride for bringing the issue of homelessness to the 
attention of the city. His statement was met with mild and cautious smattering of 
applause (12/21/07).15 While there were substantial differences in the manner in which 
both the public housing and Homeless Pride struggles concluded, city officials and 
proponents of downtown development and consumption breathed easier on December 
22nd, as both challenges to their vision of a “new” New Orleans could be declared 
quantifiably ended. Despite UNITY’s larger organizational aims to “end” homelessness 
in the New Orleans area, in this instance their considerable resources and talents had 
been deployed to stifle the search for solutions and hide the homeless, rather than to 
end homelessness as their mission states. 
 In the days following the Plaza’s closure, mischief-makers re-wrote signs 
announcing the closure of the Plaza to reflect their own interpretation of reality: rather 
than announcing the Plaza’s closure for demolition and reconstruction of the nearby 
state office building (which was the official reason given at the time), signs offered 
another interpretation, phrased slightly differently on each sign (Yorks 2007). 
                                                 
15 Mr. Nolbert was only audible because he was wearing a remote microphone that had 
been placed on him by the documentarians responsible for the footage archive that I 
have been using. 
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Coda: 2008 and forward 
For six months after the closure of Duncan Plaza, dozens of homeless people 
(some of whom had resided in Duncan Plaza, others who had not) continued to live 
outdoors in tents underneath an elevated expressway on nearby Claiborne Avenue. 
Concurrent with the closure of Duncan Plaza, the leadership of Homeless Pride 
dissolved as some of the men were provided with supportive housing vouchers or other 
temporary shelter. UNITY continued to work tirelessly to provide services, case-
management, and housing for these people as well until this area too was cleared, but 
not fenced off, in July 2008 (Reckdahl 2008).  
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In September of 2009, the Times-Picayune ran another article about the clearance 
of yet another homeless encampment, this time a few blocks further uptown under a 
different elevated highway in the central business district, across the street from a 
prominent men’s shelter called the New Orleans Mission (Reckdahl 2009). In 2011, 
UNITY notes that homelessness remains a “pervasive crisis” in the New Orleans area, 
and estimates over 9,000 people are homeless in the New Orleans region on any given 
night (UNITY 2011). They began to develop a 10-year plan to end homelessness, which 
will be announced in 2012. 
In the wake of their six month occupation of Duncan Plaza, perhaps the greatest 
victory that Homeless Pride won was that in occupying such a high-profile public 
space, they brought stark attention to the “crisis” of homelessness in New Orleans, and 
demanded that homeless people no longer be ignored or live life in the shadows. Yet 
the ephemerality of this victory could be felt in the words and tone of most in 
leadership during the final days of the Duncan Plaza encampment. 
From studying Homeless Pride’s actions, demands, and positions over several 
months, what becomes clear is that in addition to asserting themselves and the Plaza’s 
residents as a community of self-determining citizens, their goal was to promote 
alternative possibilities for addressing homelessness through housing and economic 
policies. They were demanding, even in a difficult and constrained environment, that 
their local officials could still make decisions regarding land use and budgeting 
priorities that would be in the interests of the (mostly black) working class that Mayor 
Nagin had worked so hard to keep in his political camp.   
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While they also emphasized the “crisis” and urgency of their situation and 
demanded action to house people, clearing the Plaza with such urgency was not 
something they felt was being done in their best interests, as noted above. In acting to 
“fix the problem” and end the encampment in Duncan Plaza, the city of New Orleans 
missed an opportunity—to which Mr. Miller and Mr. Nelson both allude in the above 
epigraph—to cultivate a stable and safe space where a longer-term dialogue about 
solutions could take place in such a way that not only involved “input” from the 
homeless but involved their active participation and leadership. Such a conversation is 
yet to be had in public, so I will attempt to re-initiate it in the following concluding 
chapter. 
 
 
V: Life Support 
 
Of all the suspect premises in our kit, that government could competently do more for the 
poor may have proved the lethal one.  
–Kim Hopper (2003: p. 198) 
 
There must be an alternative solution before this park is dismantled.  
 –Julius Nelson, Homeless Pride (11/19/07) 
 
 
As I discussed in the introduction, policy alone cannot explain the difference 
between the ongoing  “crisis” of thousands of homeless New Orleanians and the 
“crisis” at Duncan Plaza—only politics can. Within the context of neoliberal urbanism 
in which I have situated the efforts of Homeless Pride, there exist serious challenges to 
addressing the grievances of vulnerable people at the local level—of which people 
without homes are just one sort. Solutions, responses, and alternatives to these 
 60
relatively recent challenges are still forming, as the efforts of Homeless Pride 
demonstrate. Given the energy in social movement circles around the network of 
“Occupy” manifestations that have arisen as of September 2011, it seems worthwhile to 
unpack some of the similarities and differences between the two “mini-movements” 
(from Wright 1997: p. 296), since they both self-identify(ied) as politicized spaces 
seeking alternatives to widespread and seemingly intractable social-political problems 
of wealth and equity in society. 
In order to effectively draw out these similarities and differences, as well as the 
respective strengths and weaknesses as approaches to challenging extraordinarily 
complex and entrenched social and political problems, it is important to take a step 
back and trace a recent history of encampment/occupation spaces during in the context 
of neoliberal urbanism. Below, I outline three examples: the earliest, from Chicago, took 
place in the early stages of the neoliberal political-economic regime. Homeless Pride, 
the second, took place in what I would deem a zenith of the consolidation of this 
political economic system. Finally, the third, the Occupy movement, which is now 
taking place in a post-financial collapse environment, helps to identify some possible 
opportunities in the wake of the glaring contradictions exposed through the global 
financial meltdown of 2008.  
In his 1997 work Out of Place, Sociologist Talmadge Wright chronicles the eerily 
parallel struggles of a politicized homeless encampment in Chicago during the 1980s. In 
what became known as “Tranquility City,” homeless men and women and their 
supporters constructed makeshift dwellings both as a symbolic gesture of protest and, 
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in occupying them, a way to stabilize their own lives for security and privacy. After 
several offers of shelter and charity from the city, the squatters articulated an alternative 
proposal, including the rehabilitation of abandoned buildings and moving into 
apartments, but not shelters (Wright 1997: pp. 245-247). Ultimately acquiescing to the 
demands of the residents of Tranquility City, these homeless activists were offered 
public housing apartments—again a notable parallel to demands being made by both 
anti-demolition activists and Homeless Pride themselves. 
Having taken place during the still early stages of neoliberal urbanism, the most 
notable difference between this story and the story of Homeless Pride is that public 
housing apartments were available to be occupied in Chicago, and the local government 
allowed this solution. This difference in outcomes between Tranquility City’s 
encampment and Homeless Pride’s encampment is illustrative of what was outlined in 
Chapter two: with the increasing trend and influence of neoliberal urbanism, cities have 
experienced a persistent and continuous degradation of social safety nets over the last 
several decades. Public housing, a benchmark of the social safety net, was not an option 
to Homeless Pride because it would have also made it necessary to re-open it for 
thousands of tenants who had been displaced/evicted in August 2005 after Hurricane 
Katrina. The federal government would not tolerate any further obstacles to the 
immediate demolition of the housing developments in question. This refusal to consider 
the temporary use of public housing apartments demonstrates how far the forces of 
neoliberal urbanism have come in limiting the options available to localities to address 
issues of poverty and wealth inequity. Rather than expending several million dollars in 
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traditional and emergency federal resources to rehabilitate housing units that were 
structurally sound, millions of federal dollars were deployed to demolish and shrink 
(“redevelop”) the public housing stock while also disbursing additional millions in the 
form of Emergency Shelter Grants (ESGs) and supportive housing vouchers. The City of 
New Orleans tasked UNITY with the execution of this stopgap solution (Reckdahl 
2007).16 
The organizing strategy that brought these issues of housing and homelessness 
to the attention of local governments in Chicago and New Orleans were based on the 
20th century premise that “better housing will be achieved in the same manner that 
workers have made other gains, and that is by organizing and fighting for them” (Hill 
1935: p. 39 cited in Yates 2006: pp. 238-9 in Bratt, et al 2006). Yet given the new 
alignments and coalitions between capital and the state that are part and parcel of 
neoliberal urbanism, the limitations on the potential achievements of this traditional 
form of organizing are greater than ever. As Wright notes,  
Collective empowerment must be the focus of the continuing struggle to end 
homelessness and achieve social justice. The celebration of democratic self-
realization and self-management without the necessary public and cultural 
                                                 
16 Mike Miller notes that intense debates about UNITY’s role in clearing the Duncan 
Plaza camp consumed the office for months, but that ultimately the organization 
decided to serve the homeless regardless of the nature of the political issues 
surrounding their status (Miller interview August 2011). Many in the activist 
community use this decision to collaborate with the city as further evidence of the 
“secret solidarity” (Hopper 2003) that organizations such as UNITY possess with cities 
and states to “discipline dissent” (Choudry and Shragge 2011) or neutralize social 
movements such as Homeless Pride. Yet this argument neglects the larger context of 
decades of policies of crisis and crises of policy that has placed organizations such as 
UNITY in these “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situations in the first place. 
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spaces that allow that to occur merely reinforces systemic inequities required by 
the reproduction of capital. (1997: p 324, emphasis added) 
 
As the limitations and constraints on Homeless Pride’s actions demonstrate, these 
“necessary public and cultural spaces” are in short supply.  So it seems that 
policymakers, caseworkers, and organizers are all in need of new tools to address the 
increasing complexity and intractability of the nature of our urban problems both 
nationally and globally. 
Perhaps a new way to address these problems has arisen in the form of the 
“Occupy” movement that has now swept into dozens of cities across the United States 
since September 2011. In New Orleans, “OccupyNOLA” has chosen to set up camp in 
Duncan Plaza, which now is much larger and fenceless, since the building that was 
proposed to be demolished in early 2008 came down in 2010. While the Occupy 
movement differs in critical ways from Homeless Pride in tactics, strategy, and 
composition, important parallels unite them as well. Immediately notable differences 
were that in the first week of OccupyNOLA’s existence, the city of New Orleans placed 
four portable toilets in the Plaza for hygiene—a gesture that was never taken for 
Homeless Pride. In the same week, Mayor Mitch Landrieu walked over to the very 
same gazebo that Homeless Pride had made their operational center four years earlier, 
and greeted and spoke with several young white occupants, asking them how things 
were going, and stating his support for their actions (Donze 2011). As I note in the 
introduction, Mayor Landrieu’s hospitality will likely not extended much past 
December of 2011. 
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Mayor Landrieu’s “support” of OccupyNOLA is also placed into stark relief 
when compared to recent city actions regarding homelessness and panhandling. Two 
ordinances, both passed in 2011, have placed restrictions on “aggressive” panhandling 
in the downtown areas of New Orleans. The first made it a crime for panhandlers to use 
a wheelchair to fake an infirmity to gain sympathy from pedestrians (Gadbois 2011). 
The second places even greater restrictions on panhandling by banning “cursing or 
swearing” as well as narrowing the geographic locations where panhandling may 
occur, including “in or near parks, playgrounds, banks, ATMs, bars, liquor stores, 
convenience stores and gas stations - or within 20 feet of an intersection or marked 
crosswalk, to people in parked or stopped vehicles, or to people standing in lines” 
(Eggler 2011).  
On October 28th, 2011, the city once again cleared out an encampment under a 
highway that had been in use continuously since Duncan Plaza was closed off in 2007. 
In doing so, they did not collaborate with UNITY or any emergency shelter. Of the 85 
people the city reported moving, the majority of people were placed in temporary 
shelters, while 10 were given bus tickets to reunite with family or friends out of town 
(Dall 2011). Some of those who did not accept temporary shelter moved on to the 
OccupyNOLA space in Duncan Plaza, and Mike Miller of UNITY suspects that those 
who were given temporary shelter will end up there once that shelter allowance runs 
out  (Miller personal communication 2011).  Thus while offering vague platitudes and a 
handshake to a group of young white activists, on the other hand his administration, 
police force, and the legislative branch of city government reach for handcuffs to use on 
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the city’s poor and homeless. These issues of criminalizing and displacing the homeless 
and the permitted legality of tent-encampment-as-protest are not new, but rather 
established in recent urban history: Mayor Landrieu’s actions were in fact 
choreographed out for him many years before he even took office.  
In the concluding chapter to Citizens Without Shelter, Feldman outlines two court 
cases that illustrate the stark difference between how our society views abstract actions 
of protest versus those whose existence is a prima facie condemnation of our inequitable 
society. In the first case, Clark v Community for Creative Nonviolence, the US Supreme 
Court denied homeless activists the right to sleep in tents in a park near the White 
House as a form of protest, instead allowing them only the ability to erect two tents and 
leave them empty as a gesture of protest. In the second case, Metropolitan Council v Safir, 
a federal district court ruled in favor of another group of housing activists in New York 
who were protesting against rent increases in rent-controlled apartments in New York 
City. The activists, who in this case were not homeless, were allowed to sleep outdoors 
near Gracie Mansion as part of their action. 
As Feldman describes, the difference between the rights of housed and un-
housed citizens creates an identity of a “demonstrator” that is restricted to those who 
are housed. Indeed, he argues, “in allowing a housed citizens’ overnight vigil while 
preventing occupation of a homeless tent city, these cases produce an exclusionary 
vision of ‘expressive’ citizenship in opposition to a subordinate status of bare life” 
(2004: p. 141). This tension is best demonstrated in the false binary assumed in this New 
York Times headline: “Dissenting, or Seeking Shelter? Homeless Stake a Claim at 
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Protests” (Nagourney 2011). The presumption here is that people who are homeless and 
sleeping in public are incapable of also having any political identity, or of contributing 
to the political statements of others. 
The omnipresent condescension of the New York Times notwithstanding, the 
confluence of homelessness with Occupy spaces in cities such as Portland, Los Angeles, 
Atlanta, Washington DC, and New Orleans changes the messaging, limits, and 
potential of these spaces as well (Craig 2011; Ryan 2011; McKinley and Goodnough 
2011). Indeed, Endesha Juakali returned to Duncan Plaza in early October to forewarn 
the OccupyNOLA crowd that should they decide to once again encourage the poor, 
homeless, and people of color to join them in the space, that they would find the city’s 
reaction to likely change from its initially warm reception (personal communication 
10/25/2011).17 As Nagourney and McKinley and Goodnough note, these tensions have 
already begun to arise (2011). Wright and Feldman echo Juakali’s analysis of politicized 
homeless encampments, and Feldman’s description of the potential of a politicized 
homeless encampment seems to dovetail with what is emerging in the space of Duncan 
Plaza in 2011:  
A politicized homeless encampment troubles the boundary between public and 
private: it provides needed protection from the elements and the space for civic 
involvement, shields the body and facilitates action, provides a space for 
withdrawal and expresses a critique of the injustices of homelessness (Feldman 
2004: p. 141, emphasis in original).  
 
                                                 
17 Juakali’s prediction proved rather prescient, as I noted in the introduction (Donze 
2011b) 
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In Homeless Pride’s determination that tents not be dismantled until an 
alternative solution was provided, there are the roots of the Occupy movement’s 
defiance of those who argue that there must be some definitive “endgame” to an 
outdoor occupation—some concrete manifestation of demands, rather than the simple 
occupation of public space for the sake of using it as a staging ground to forge solutions, 
rather than demand them. I join Feldman in urging that urban scholars and 
policymakers use these cases of occupation as an opportunity to build a greater and 
more pluralized understanding of the habits of dwelling: what Feldman calls a “critical 
responsiveness” that builds towards a stronger and broader “ethic of dwelling” (2004). 
This ethos among urban professionals should be deployed to counter municipal 
crackdowns on these spaces in the name of thinly veiled political calculations disguised 
as concerns for public welfare. 
 It is important here also to distinguish promoting a broader understanding, or 
“ethos” of dwelling, from simply romanticizing those who sleep outdoors—the “sacred 
freedom” quadrant of Feldman’s axes (see Chapter two). As Mr. Julius Nelson himself 
said, even the most politicized leaders of Homeless Pride agreed with city officials and 
service providers that “a public park is not suitable living conditions [sic] and is 
inhumane for human life.”  In saying this, however, Mr. Nelson and the other leaders of 
Homeless Pride did not shrink from their determination to articulate the need for 
alternatives. As Mr. Nelson went on to testify to the City Council: “there must be a 
suitable and concrete alternative solution, not only for the residents of Duncan Plaza 
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but those that are living in substandard living conditions across our community” 
(Nelson 11/19/07).  
*** 
In some of the more activist works on homelessness produced over the last two 
decades, the authors typically end with a passionate and/or condemnatory jeremiad on 
the nature and failures of our society to provide for the most vulnerable with profound 
flourishing quotations such as “we must love one another or die.” (Hopper 2003: p. 203) 
Despite my best efforts, I find myself unable conclude any differently, although I 
suspect the most eloquent and inspirational phrasing has already been used in someone 
else’s work.  
The preceding chapters are chocked full of disillusioning realities: in the rare 
cases that local governments and non-profits want to act progressively, they are 
constrained; there are insufficient resources allocated to make the changes that activists 
and policymakers seek; even in times of general economic growth and prosperity, 
homelessness increases. Perhaps this reigning impenetrable fortress of chronic 
hopelessness is what promotes such passionate yet impotent rhetorical flourishes 
among those who write about homelessness.  
Successful homelessness policies cannot be divorced, as they have become, from 
a broader social and political commitment to a social contract that declares poverty 
illegal, immoral, or otherwise unconstitutional. The current practices that focus on 
“housing first”, as UNITY has been executing, are indeed improvements on emergency 
shelter and rapid-rehousing models. Yet like progressive municipal administrations, 
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these progressive elements of policy remain islands of good practice in a sea of 
decaying political and economic standards that function to steadily counteract and 
engulf them. If, like some of the authors in Bratt, Hartmann, and Stone’s (2006) volume 
on Human Rights and a New Social Agenda, we continue to be shocked and dismayed 
by the ongoing presence of homelessness in a society of such wealth and privilege, it 
seems unlikely that much can or will change. Massive and chronic homelessness is not 
an aberration, a mistake, an oversight, or a crisis. It is a way of life that we choose and 
validate on a daily basis. These types of connections are only just now beginning to seep 
into a national public discourse that is stacked heavily against allowing such messages 
to thrive. 
Such a broad societal problem can be met and defeated with the solutions that 
many have advocated over the past several decades: jobs that pay living wages, 
unconditional and affordable access to healthcare for those with mental and physical 
illnesses, de-commodified/public housing for all those who need it, and so forth. 
However, the repetition of demands for these policies from scholars and activists, 
caseworkers and survivors of homelessness alike, ideologically coherent though they 
may be, smacks of the most unfortunate form of political posturing: those demands that 
come from a group of noise-makers with no threatening political base. Without a wider 
political base for this progressive—nay, socialist—domestic policy agenda at local, 
regional, and national scales, the policy and operational victories of organizations like 
UNITY, and the social-political victories of groups like Homeless Pride will continue to 
be limited and temporary.  
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And yet, despite the juggernaut of obstacles aligned against these mini-
movements, the hope for a different future remains most potent at the local level, where 
these “resistant heterotopia” (Wright 1997) and broader ethics of dwelling can begin to 
be built. For all of the increasing limitations on non-consumptive behaviors in urban 
spaces (freedom to protest, of movement, and to stay put), the city is still the space from 
which these solutions will emerge and grow upwards to permeate our wider social 
fabric. From the arc of Tranquility City in Chicago to Homeless Pride in New Orleans, 
to the national Occupy movement, one can detect the seeds of an emerging 
understanding of which institutions and actors hold the power to address local 
grievances.  
As I described in chapter four, the nature of Homeless Pride’s grievances began a 
subtle shift from their originally localized beginnings to Mr. Nelson and Mr. Nolbert’s 
eventually broader critiques. Most indicative of this would be in the quote from Mr. 
Nolbert above: “You don’t have no money, you don’t get no honey” (11/9/07). If the 
Occupy movement that now spans dozens of cities across the United States could be 
said to have a unifying message, Mr. Nolbert’s words could be used to express it. This 
outcome would seem to be the natural extension of an unfolding reaction among social 
movement activists and organizations to the processes of neoliberalism and neoliberal 
urbanism: after decades of increasing supremacy and power of the interests of finance 
and real estate capital, social movements are now broadly turning their critiques and 
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demands to actors far larger than city, state, or even federal governments. They are 
directing them at the trans-local, multi-scalar power structure of finance capital.18  
Within the context of a debilitated and decayed capitalist welfare state indicative 
of this political-economic regime of neoliberalism and neoliberal urbanism, 
“homelessness policy” in aggregate amounts to enhanced bureaucratic competence and 
client service for those among the temporary and chronically homeless who are capable 
enough to navigate bureaucratic systems. Rather than targeting these bureaucratic 
systems, which are trapped, like many other social safety net programs in a paradigm of 
systematic starvation, the experiences of Homeless Pride—both its failures and its 
successes—suggest that the future of urban organizing lies with those groups who are 
able to link their concrete grievances to larger structures of power and influence such as 
globalized finance and real estate capital.  
Rather than addressing issues as “crises”, they are being articulated as systemic 
injustices that can and must be met and challenged through years of broad-based 
organizing and power building. Such work has already begun to be pioneered in the 
creation of networks such as the Right to the City Alliance, fittingly named for David 
Harvey’s 2008 revival of the phrase from its Lefebvrian roots (Harvey 2008). Groups 
such as Picture the Homeless in New York City provide a blueprint for organizing with 
and among those who have experienced various forms of homelessness, and how to 
                                                 
18 This is not to suggest that targeting financial institutions in general is new, but the 
coordination and coherence of this critique nationally and globally is certainly growing. 
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unite short-term goals and objectives with the long-term strategic interests of other 
groups focused on housing and economic justice more broadly.  
The confluence of member-based organizing among mostly people of color (of 
which Homeless Pride was a proto-formation) with the tech-savvy anti-capitalism of 
mostly white activists remains fraught with conflicting visions of tactics and strategy. 
Racism further amplifies and reproduces these conflicts (Nagourney 2011). Yet in 
OccupyNOLA’s decision to draw on the history of Homeless Pride to justify the 
occupation site of Duncan Plaza, those who seek to promote a more just society locally 
and nationally cannot help but feel a sense of hope—one that is, as always, grounded in 
the quick-sand of the accumulated knowledge of the failures of the past and the depth 
of the challenges that lie ahead. Possibly the best hope for all of the future Homeless 
Pride incarnations that have yet to be shepherded into existence is that, unlike Calvino’s 
insistence in the epigraph that spaces outside the inferno must be “given”, these spaces 
are being taken. In taking and (re)making these spaces, rather than waiting for them to 
be relinquished, they are perhaps more likely to endure. 
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Appendix A—Duncan Plaza Activist Fliers 
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Appendix B: Interwoven messaging. Julius Nelson holds two signs with two different 
but related messages. 
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